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 WHAT IS PUERTO RICO? 
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF,* ALEXANDRA BURSAK,**  
RUSSELL RENNIE*** & ALEC WEBLEY**** 
Puerto Rico is suffering through multiple crises. Two are obvious: a financial crisis 
triggered by the island’s public debts and the humanitarian crisis brought on by 
Hurricane Maria. One is not: the island’s ongoing crisis of constitutional identity. 
Like the hurricane, this crisis came from outside the island. Congress, the U.S. 
Supreme Court, and the Executive Branch have each moved in the last twenty years 
to undermine the “inventive statesmanship” that allowed for Puerto Rico’s self-
government with minimal interference from a federal government in which the 
people of Puerto Rico had, and have, no representation. From the point of view of 
federal officials, it now appears that statehood, independence, or subjugation are the 
only constitutionally acceptable options for Puerto Rico. Yet the federal 
government’s formalist absolutism is inconsistent with the text and history of the U.S. 
Constitution—as well as the needs and desires of the U.S. citizens who make up 
Puerto Rico’s population. A review of the constitutional history of the Territory 
Clause, including a reexamination of the difficult Insular Cases, reveals the range of 
sovereign relations available to Puerto Rico within its current Commonwealth 
status. Only a resumption of inventive statesmanship, of the kind found throughout 
U.S. history, including the modern treatment of Indian tribes, can provide a 
satisfactory answer to the question of “What Is Puerto Rico?,” and only a 
satisfactory answer to that question can contribute the political preconditions for a 
lasting recovery from the financial and natural disasters afflicting the island. 
 
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................... 2 
I.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF PUERTO RICO ............................................... 4 
II.  THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH REBELS ................................................................... 13 
III.  SUPREME COURT FORMALISM ......................................................................... 19 
IV. CONGRESS WEIGHS IN ..................................................................................... 26 
V.  WHERE TO NOW? ............................................................................................. 34 
A.  THE INSULAR CASES REDUX ..................................................................... 34 
B.  RECONSIDERING THE PARALLELS TO AMERICAN INDIAN LAW ................ 39 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 44 
                                                                                                                 
 
 *. Reiss Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law. The 
authors thank our many interlocutors in Puerto Rico for insights for this Article. We benefitted 
from extensive discussions with former governors Alejandro García Padilla, Aníbal Acevedo 
Vilá, and Rafael Hernández Colón. As discussed below, the initial work on this Article was 
done when the authors were serving as legal advisors to Governor García Padilla and the 
Partido Popular Democrático. No views in this Article should be attributed to anyone other 
than the authors. We also learned from NYU colleagues Clayton Gillette, Daniel Hulsebosch, 
Troy McKenzie, and Richard Pildes. Rona Li, Daniel Loehr, and Benjamin Perotin provided 
great research assistance. Our thanks to Victoria Wolfe and the staff of the Indiana Law 
Journal for exemplary editing and proofing. 
 **. Law Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
 ***. Law Clerk, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
 ****. Law Clerk, New York State Court of Appeals. 
2 INDIANA LAW JOURNA L  [Vol. 94:1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Not since the Civil War has a substantial area of the United States been so 
thoroughly laid to waste as was Puerto Rico following Hurricane Maria. The 
sustained impact of the hurricane more completely compromised access to basic 
amenities, such as clean water and electricity, than any prior natural disaster in the 
United States.1 The physical devastation of Puerto Rico compounded the terrible 
financial straits in which the bankrupt Commonwealth found itself even before the 
storm. That history of financial collapse in turn prompted President Trump’s more 
uncharitable accounts of the fate of Puerto Rico.2 And the hesitating federal response 
highlighted once again uncertainty about the relation between Puerto Rico and the 
United States, as President Trump immediately questioned the ultimate financial 
responsibility for the inevitable reconstruction, something never broached in 
Houston or New Orleans or Florida.3 Even in the midst of a natural disaster, there 
was no escaping the exposed wound of the political status of Puerto Rico.  
Our immediate point of departure for this Article is not the human toll exacted on 
Puerto Rico by nature and fiscal collapse, but the question of political responsibility. 
The events of the day, from hurricane relief to debt restructuring, brought to public 
attention uncertainty about what it means to be a “Commonwealth,” a legal status 
unmentioned in the U.S. Constitution, a word that lacks a direct translation into 
Spanish, and indeed a concept without a terribly clear meaning in English.4 
Indeed, less than half a year before Hurricane Maria, on June 11, 2017, citizens 
of Puerto Rico voted for the fifth time in fifty years on their preference for the 
political organization of what in Puerto Rico is referred to as the “island,” even if 
technically an archipelago.5 There were three options presented: “Statehood,” “Free 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See, e.g., Caitlin Dickerson & Luis Ferré-Sadurní, ‘Like Going Back in Time’: Puerto 
Ricans Put Survival Skills to Use, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2017/10/24/us/hurricane-maria-puerto-rico-coping.html [https://perma.cc/M8BB-TUBF] 
(chronicling just some of the devastation experienced on the island since Maria). 
 2. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Caitlin Dickerson, Trump Warns Storm-Ravaged Puerto Rico 
that Aid Won’t Last ‘Forever’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017 
/10/12/us/politics/trump-warns-puerto-rico-weeks-after-storms-federal-help-cannot-stay 
-forever.html [https://perma.cc/7BH8-BG93]. 
 3. John Wagner, Trump: ‘Big Decisions’ Ahead on How Much to Spend on a ‘Destroyed’ 
Puerto Rico, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post 
-politics/wp/2017/09/29/trump-big-decisions-ahead-on-how-much-to-spend-on-a-destroyed 
-puerto-rico [https://perma.cc/2WH3-LWQT]. 
 4. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “commonwealth” as, variously, “the whole 
body of people comprising a nation or state,” “a body politic,” “a state,” “an independent 
community,” “a republic,” “a democratic state,” a “state of the United States of America,” “a 
body of persons united by some common interest,” and “an association of self-governing 
nations.” Commonwealth, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry 
/37261?redirectedFrom=Commonwealth#eid [https://perma.cc/A5N4-2K5K]. The term 
serves as well as the titles for a federal government (Australia, from 1901 to the present); a 
unitary state (Commonwealth of England, during the Civil War); a supranational federation 
(Commonwealth of Nations/Commonwealth of Independent States); and as one of various 
related concepts of political philosophy (as with John Locke). 
 5. Nick Brown & Tracy Rucinski, Puerto Rico Governor Vows Statehood Push After 
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Association/Independence,” and “Current Territorial Status.”6 In a result more 
typically associated with voting in the former Soviet Union, the statehood option 
won a jaw-dropping ninety-seven percent of the votes cast—a reflection of a boycott 
of the referendum by the major opponents of Governor Ricardo Rosselló’s pro-
statehood New Progressive Party.7 In a jurisdiction where voter turnout typically 
reaches seventy percent and above, only twenty-three percent of eligible voters 
participated.8  
The desultory referendum was an orchestrated effort to tarnish any choice but 
statehood, an unfortunate rendition of democratic choice for a community still 
straddling self-determination and dependence on the United States. The legacy of 
colonial subjugation was doubly imprinted onto the referendum choice 
—even a vote for “Statehood” was presented as requesting “the Federal government 
to immediately begin the process for the decolonization of Puerto Rico with the 
admission of Puerto Rico as a state.”9 Free Association/Independence was offered as 
a vote to become independent and pursue an unspecified treaty-based relationship 
with the United States that would be further refined in a second stage of voting.10 
Finally, Puerto Rico’s present relationship with the United States—what is termed a 
“Free Associated State” (“Estado Libre Asociado”) in its official Spanish 
translation—was depicted rather pejoratively as a continuation of the “Current 
Territorial Status.”11 
Holding a referendum on political status is nothing new in Puerto Rico, and 
unfortunately neither are peculiar referendum results. The next most recent 
referendum, held in 2012, led to an apparent mandate for statehood, but some 
500,000 ballots were left blank in protest over confusing procedures and wording.12 
In response, Congress ignored the 2012 plebiscite and appropriated $2.5 million in 
                                                                                                                 
 
Referendum Win, REUTERS (June 12, 2017, 10:22 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us 
-puertorico-debt-vote-idUSKBN1931NG [https://perma.cc/3VSZ-QRDE]. 
 6. STATE ELECTIONS COMM’N, PLEBISCITE FOR THE IMMEDIATE DECOLONIZATION OF 
PUERTO RICO (2017), http://plebiscito2017.ceepur.org/docs/Papeleta%20Plebiscito.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LJW4-H8UV]. 
 7. Frances Robles, 23% of Puerto Ricans Vote in Referendum, 97% of Them for 
Statehood, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/11/us/puerto 
-ricans-vote-on-the-question-of-statehood.html [https://perma.cc/TCH3-2HCJ]. 
      8.   Id. 
 9. STATE ELECTIONS COMM’N, supra note 6. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. To be fair, the legacy of colonialism weighs heavily on the history of Puerto Rico 
under American rule. See José A. Cabranes, Some Common Ground, in FOREIGN IN A 
DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION AND THE CONSTITUTION 39, 40–41 
(Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001) (“Speaking plainly and honestly about 
our history requires us to acknowledge, without rancor and without embarrassment, that 
colonialism is a simple and perfectly useful word to describe a relationship between a powerful 
metropolitan state and a poor overseas dependency that does not participate meaningfully in 
the formal lawmaking processes that shape the daily lives of its people.”). 
 12. Danica Coto, Puerto Rico Says ‘Yes’ to Statehood; Now It’s Up to Congress, CHI. 
TRIB. (June 11, 2017, 4:48 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-puerto 
-rico-referendum-20170611-story.html [https://perma.cc/59X7-WUBK]. 
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funds to hold yet another vote on political status.13 This appropriation was contingent 
on the Department of Justice (DOJ) approving the language of any proposed 
plebiscite (specifically, making a finding that the options conformed to the policies 
and laws of the United States) at least forty-five days before the election.14 The 
Justice Department refused to approve the wording of the 2017 plebiscite and, rather 
than restate the options on the ballot to access federal funding, the desperately-
indebted Puerto Rican government assumed all the costs of a sham vote.15  
This strange congressional requirement that Puerto Rico’s referendum options 
conform to U.S. law and policy served as the genesis of this Article. The authors 
were hired by the then-Governor of Puerto Rico, Alejandro García Padilla, and the 
(now out-of-power) Popular Democratic Party, to examine precisely the question that 
would confront the Justice Department under the statute: what does it mean to present 
options compatible with U.S. law and policy, as required by the referendum statute? 
We remain committed to the proposition that the choice among options must, in the 
first instance, rest with the people of Puerto Rico.16 But this is no answer to the 
question we were first retained to engage in 2015: what exactly are the options 
available?  
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF PUERTO RICO 
Our inquiry is even more specific than the full range of possible lawful 
arrangements. Certain options are fairly self-explanatory. Were Puerto Rico to 
become independent, it would become a nation among many, free to enter into any 
treaty-based relations with the United States, much as has post-independence 
Philippines. But such a path would put in jeopardy a highly-valued birthright of 
Puerto Ricans, the American citizenship conferred by the Jones-Shafroth Act,17 and 
seems an unlikely prospect politically.18 At the other end of the spectrum, were 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5, 61 (2014); 
see also H.R. REP. NO. 113-171, at 53 (2013) (describing purpose of enactment); Leslie Picker 
& Dawn Giel, Statehood? Sovereignty? Bankrupt Puerto Rico Heads to Ballot Box for ‘Status’ 
Vote, CNBC (June 9, 2017, 10:28 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/09/statehood 
-sovereignty-bankrupt-puerto-rico-heads-to-ballot-box-for-status-vote.html [https://perma 
.cc/LLU7-CDK5].  
 14. Colin Wilhelm, Puerto Rico Governor Pushes Statehood as Vote Looms Despite No 
U.S. Support, POLITICO (May 26, 2017, 4:32 PM), http://www.politico.com/story 
/2017/05/26/puerto-rico-statehood-is-it-possible-238867 [https://perma.cc/K3MV-E249]. 
 15. After the DOJ rejected the ballot and denied the funds, Puerto Rico’s sole (nonvoting) 
congressional representative, Jenniffer González, stated: “This is not about the money; this is 
more than that. So keep the money. Let us express ourselves. And that is what we are going to 
have [with the plebiscite].” Picker & Giel, supra note 13.  
 16. We take no position on whether there is a right to demand statehood or independence, 
either as a matter of American constitutional law or under international law, a question well 
presented in Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Puerto Rico and the Right of Accession, 43 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 229, 264 (2018). We agree with Blocher and Gulati that the choice of status should 
be that of the citizens of Puerto Rico. Our aim here is to elucidate what exactly are the rights 
associated with the current status if there is no alteration. 
 17. Pub. L. No. 64-368, 39 Stat. 951 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 733 (2012)). 
 18. Despite lingering questions about the various plebiscite votes, the independence 
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Puerto Rico to become a U.S. state, then the integration of new states from Vermont 
in 1791 to Hawaii in 1959 provides a well-trod path for accession. We may remain 
skeptical that those presently in control of the federal government would readily 
admit a new state with a large Democratic majority,19 immense public debt, and—to 
boot—a Spanish-speaking populace.20 Statehood requires assent from Congress,21 
and this particular tango partner seems especially reticent.22  
Rather, our focus is on the current default option, leaving aside the latest 
plebiscite’s tendentious characterizations about territory and colonialism. If nothing 
were to change in terms of independence or statehood, questions would still remain: 
What is Puerto Rico at present? What is its status under current American law and 
policy? And, what are the constitutional boundaries on the range of permissible 
forms of governance available to Puerto Rico while still territorially affiliated with 
the United States? 
The complicated political status of Puerto Rico begins with the name for its 
relation to the United States. In the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act of 1950 (often 
referred to simply as “Public Law 600”), which kicked off the process that eventually 
led to the island’s present Constitution,23 Puerto Rico is defined as a commonwealth, 
                                                                                                                 
 
movement has proven to have very limited traction politically in Puerto Rico. See Dieter 
Nohlen, Puerto Rico, in 1 ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAS: A DATA HANDBOOK 555 (Dieter 
Nohlen ed., 2005) (independence received 2.6% of the vote in the 1998 Referendum); Mariano 
Castillo, Puerto Ricans Favor Statehood for First Time, CNN: POLITICS (Nov. 8, 2012, 10:32 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/election-puerto-rico/index.html [https://perma 
.cc/XV6K-G3RY] (of the 54% of voters who rejected the current commonwealth regime, only 
6% voted for outright independence); Senado de Puerto Rico 18VA. Asamblea Legislativa, 
SENADO ESPERANZA Y PROGRESO, http://senado.pr.gov/Pages/Senadores.aspx [https://perma 
.cc/39TG-URGY] (Puerto Rican Independence Party has only one representative in the Puerto 
Rican Senate). 
 19. See Ryan Struyk, Here’s What Would Happen to US Politics if Puerto Rico Became 
a State, CNN: POLITICS (Oct. 14, 2017, 10:51 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/14 
/politics/puerto-rico-state-congress-white-house/index.html [https://perma.cc/5N6T-BNJW]. 
 20. Characteristics of the Group Quarters Population in Puerto Rico: 2012-2016 
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https:// 
factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF [https://perma 
.cc/V5TW-KHDV] (an estimated 94.5% of Puerto Ricans speak Spanish in the home). 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
 22. See, e.g., Katanga Johnson, Puerto Rico Pressing on in Its Quest for Statehood, ROLL 
CALL (Aug. 22, 2017, 5:03 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/puerto-rico 
-statehood-congressional-delegation [https://perma.cc/8JUD-V9NJ] (“Congress has the 
power to grant statehood but that remains an unlikely proposition given the current political 
climate on the Hill . . . .”); Vann R. Newkirk II, Puerto Rico’s Plebiscite to Nowhere, 
ATLANTIC (June 13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/puerto-rico 
-statehood-plebiscite-congress/530136 [https://perma.cc/Y8QP-WU5E] (“In today’s political 
climate, the Republican-dominated [Congress] won’t feel any pressure to add an island of 
millions of likely Democrats to the electorate.”); Frances Robles, Despite Vote in Favor, 
Puerto Rico Faces a Daunting Road Toward Statehood, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/us/trump-puerto-rico-statehood-congress.html [https:// 
perma.cc/32JE-CHDK] (“The Republicans are also considered highly unlikely to do 
something that could result in five more Democrats in the House and two in the Senate.”). 
 23. Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 (1950) 
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a term that admits of no ready translation into Spanish or definition in English and is 
allowed the title of “Free Associated State” (“Estado Libre Asociado”) under the 
official Spanish translation. Its residents are entitled to self-government yet cannot 
vote in elections for federal office in the United States,24 save in U.S. presidential 
primaries.25 But Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens,26 and at the same time popularly 
elect their own governor and bicameral legislature to control local government.27 
Puerto Ricans are holders of American passports, can enter the United States freely, 
and may establish residency and voting eligibility upon disembarking without 
customs or special legal barriers.28 The United States manages Puerto Rico’s foreign 
affairs and defense,29 but Puerto Rico sends its own team to the Olympics.30 Puerto 
Ricans fight in the U.S. military and are represented by the federal government in the 
United Nations.31 Puerto Ricans pay no federal taxes32 yet are eligible for federal 
benefits,33 with twenty-four percent of the island’s population currently drawing 
                                                                                                                 
 
(codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 731b–731e (2012)); see Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 
1863, 1868–69 (2016). 
 24. See generally Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 25. See DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., THE CHARTER & THE BYLAWS OF THE DEMOCRATIC 
PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (amended 2018), http://democrats.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2018/09/DNC_Charter_Bylaws_3.12.181.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW7W-N4JX]; 
REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., THE RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 16–17 (amended 2018), 
https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/2016-Republican-Rules-Reformatted2018 
_1533138132.pdf [https://perma.cc/C822-Y9Y3]. 
 26. Jones-Shafroth Act, Pub. L. No. 64-368, 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 
733 (2012)). 
 27. REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON PUERTO RICO’S STATUS 18 (2011) 
[hereinafter 2011 REPORT]. See generally P.R. CONST. art. III; id. art. IV. 
 28. See Eduardo Guzmán, Comment, Igartúa De La Rosa v. United States: The Right of 
the United States Citizens of Puerto Rico to Vote for the President and the Need to Re-Evaluate 
America’s Territorial Policy, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 142 n.5 (2001). 
 29. 2011 REPORT, supra note 27. 
 30. Alexis E. Quinones, Unique Industry, Unique Relationship = Unique Perspective: A 
Quick Look at Some Issues of Puerto Rican Sports, 15 SPORTS L.J. 195, 201 (2008) (“The 
[International Olympic Committee] has recognized Puerto Rico’s Olympic Committee 
(COPUR) since January 1948, two years before Congress’s approval of a Constitution for the 
island and four years before its ratification in 1952.” (footnote omitted)). 
 31. Shannon Collins, Puerto Ricans Represented Throughout U.S. Military History, U.S. 
DEP’T DEFENSE (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/974518 
/puerto-ricans-represented-throughout-us-military-history [https://perma.cc/AU8X-47QB] 
(“As citizens of the United States, Puerto Ricans have participated in every major United 
States military engagement from World War I onward.”); Member States, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html [https://perma.cc/LD9H-SG9Y].  
 32. 26 U.S.C. § 933 (2012). 
 33. Josh Hicks, Puerto Ricans Who Can’t Speak English Qualify as Disabled for Social 
Security, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal 
-eye/wp/2015/04/10/puerto-ricans-who-cant-speak-english-qualify-as-disabled-for-social 
-security [https://perma.cc/FG2R-QCF4]. 
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Social Security benefits, a higher percentage than almost any U.S. state.34 Indeed, 
prior to Hurricane Maria, nearly half the island’s population was on Medicaid. 35 
More incongruous still is the application of federal economic regulations to Puerto 
Rico. Under the Jones Act, any shipping between U.S. ports must be on U.S.-flagged 
ships,36 which not only raises the cost of goods brought to Puerto Rico37 but also 
prevents the island from transitioning to natural gas—the longstanding prohibitions 
on any exports of fossil fuels from the United States meant that, until recently, there 
were no U.S. vessels capable of carrying natural gas and thus no natural gas capable 
of being conveniently shipped to the island.38 The application of U.S. minimum wage 
laws to Puerto Rico results in labor costs roughly double those in Puerto Rico’s 
Caribbean counterparts and has been estimated to reduce employment on the island 
by eight to ten percent.39 One manifestation of the damage done by the mechanical 
application of the federal minimum wage laws has been Puerto Rico’s failure to 
exploit its tourism potential. The number of hotel beds throughout the island has seen 
only modest growth since the 1970s,40 increasing from around 9000 to 15,000 in 
2015.41 In comparison, the Dominican Republic increased from 1600 to 60,000 and 
Jamaica went from 6600 to 20,000.42 These rivals continue to aggressively expand 
their tourism sectors, with the Dominican Republic planning to reach 100,000 hotel 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. Compare SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUERTO RICO: CONGRESSIONAL STATISTICS (2017), 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/factsheets/cong_stats/2017/pr.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YN7 
-E5PM] (providing the total number of Social Security beneficiaries in Puerto Rico), and 
QuickFacts: Puerto Rico, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/pr 
[https://perma.cc/8DK3-AZVU] (providing an estimate of the total population in Puerto Rico), 
with SOC. SEC. ADMIN., BENEFICIARIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL RESIDENT POPULATION 
AND OF THE POPULATION AGED 65 OR OLDER, BY STATE (2017), https://www.ssa 
.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/oasdi_sc/2017/table01.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7XL-H6L7] 
(providing the percentage of Social Security beneficiaries for each U.S. state). 
 35. Puerto Rico: Medicaid Overview, MEDICAID, https://www.medicaid.gov 
/medicaid/by-state/puerto-rico.html [https://perma.cc/XW9G-SZGL]. 
 36. 46 U.S.C. § 55102(b) (2006). 
 37. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., REPORT ON THE COMPETITIVENESS OF PUERTO RICO’S 
ECONOMY 13, 22 (2012), www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/regional/PuertoRico 
/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/63QL-VEWX] (estimating cost of shipping to Puerto Rico as 
double that to the Dominican Republic or Jamaica). 
 38. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-260, PUERTO RICO: CHARACTERISTICS 
OF THE ISLAND’S MARITIME TRADE AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF MODIFYING THE JONES ACT 20 
& n.28 (2013). 
 39. Alida Castillo-Freeman & Richard B. Freeman, When the Minimum Wage Really 
Bites: The Effect of the U.S.-Level Minimum on Puerto Rico, in IMMIGRATION AND THE 
WORKFORCE: ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND SOURCE AREAS 177, 
178 (George J. Borjas & Richard B. Freeman eds., 1992).   
 40. ANNE O. KRUEGER, RANJIT TEJA & ANDREW WOLFE, PUERTO RICO – A WAY 
FORWARD 8 (2015), http://www.gdbpr.com/documents/PuertoRicoAWayForward.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X4G7-S23N]. 
 41. Jessica DiNapoli, Tourism to Puerto Rico Is Down in the Wake of the Debt Crisis, 
BUS. INSIDER (July 27, 2015, 12:14 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-puerto 
-rico-tourism-industry-lags-rivals-offers-little-relief-from-debt-crisis-2015-7 [https://perma 
.cc/76KJ-LY4K]. 
 42. Id. 
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rooms by the end of 2018.43 Puerto Rico, held back by obligations imposed by federal 
law, is falling ever further behind these regional rivals. With regulatory controls 
imported wholesale from the mainland, Puerto Rico finds itself at a consistent 
disadvantage regionally, a condition exacerbated in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Maria.  
The resulting statutory, regulatory, and constitutional hodgepodge means that, in 
the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, “Puerto Rico occupies a relationship to the 
United States that has no parallel in [American] history.”44 But that hodgepodge had 
a historic logic as the era of overt colonialism drew to a close. The turn to greater 
autonomy in local affairs after World War II fit comfortably with the international 
move toward self-determination and the closing of the colonial era. As then-Judge, 
now-Justice, Breyer put it, “[t]he theme that consistently runs throughout the 
legislative history of Puerto Rico’s attainment of Commonwealth status is . . . 
increasing self-government over local affairs by the people of Puerto Rico.”45 But 
unlike the great run of decolonization in Asia and Africa, Puerto Rico’s formal legal 
relationship with the United States remained intact, even as its functional autonomy 
increased. The list of paradoxical legal relations goes on and on, yet it all comes back 
time and again to the evolving, if ill-understood, concepts of “Commonwealth” and 
“Estado Libre Asociado.”  
Our assessment of these fraught terms begins with what it means for the United 
States to have longstanding relations with territories defined by three critical 
attributes: (1) their domiciliaries are U.S. citizens; (2) these domiciliaries have some 
but not all of the political and civil rights of other U.S. citizens living within the 
incorporated states of the United States, most notably they are citizens without 
national-level voting rights unless they leave the territory and move to the mainland; 
and (3) there is no immediate prospect of statehood or other fundamental change in 
the territory’s political status. The status of territories prior to statehood has been a 
convulsive controversy in American constitutional history, ranging back to the 
formal question presented in Dred Scott v. Sandford of the federal power to regulate 
slavery holdings in the so-called incorporated territories (i.e., those territories that 
were anticipated, at the time of their creation, to eventually be admitted as states).46 
That controversy continues in the dissatisfaction over the current status of the District 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. Dominican Republic Could Reach 100k Hotel Rooms in 2018, DOMINICAN TODAY 
(Aug. 15, 2017, 7:08 PM), https://dominicantoday.com/dr/tourism/2017/08/15/dominican 
-republic-could-reach-100k-hotel-rooms-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/QS3D-XZ6A]. 
 44. Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 
596 (1976).  
 45. Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 
36, 40 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 46. 60 U.S. 393, 446 (1857) (“There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to 
the Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United States or at 
a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure; nor to enlarge its territorial limits in 
any way, except by the admission of new States. That power is plainly given; and if a new 
State is admitted, it needs no further legislation by Congress, because the Constitution itself 
defines the relative rights and powers, and duties of the State, and the citizens of the State, and 
the Federal Government. But no power is given to acquire a Territory to be held and governed 
permanently in that character.”). 
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of Columbia and to the permanent disputes over the extent of sovereignty enjoyed 
by American Indian tribes and their tribal governments.  
The governmental status of Puerto Rico through the twentieth century until the 
late 1990s can be separated into two major periods. The first period’s legal structure 
emerged from the so-called Insular Cases,47 a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
starting in 1901 delineating the constitutional and statutory status of the United 
States’ new territorial acquisitions. In this period, the United States acquired a 
number of overseas lands that were neither states nor had the ready prospect of 
eventual statehood. Using the legal concept of “unincorporated territory,” the 
Supreme Court deemed these jurisdictions outside the full constitutional structure of 
the United States, even if subject to some fundamental protections of American 
law.48 As an unincorporated territory, Puerto Rico was a territorial subject capable of 
being given (or not given) certain rights and authorities pursuant to the prerogative 
power of its territorial master. There is no escaping the reality that the Insular Cases 
were part and parcel of the early period of American empire, heavily imbued with 
notions of racial destiny and imperial domination. Indeed, in one of the first Insular 
Cases, Downes v. Bidwell, the Court spoke of the newly acquired territories as being 
“inhabited by alien races,” such that governance “according to Anglo-Saxon 
principles, may for a time be impossible.”49 
In this first period, the Court applied the relevant constitutional provisions 
flexibly, recognizing that the Constitution of the imperial era could not sustain the 
assumption of the early Republic that territories would move steadily toward 
statehood. Thus, the Court accepted that a mechanical application of the 
constitutional conventions respecting newly-acquired territory threatened the needed 
“power to acquire and hold territory as property or as appurtenant to the United 
States.”50 Extending full rights to people the Court described as “utterly unfit for 
American citizenship,”51 especially as a matter of constitutional law, was 
unthinkable. The result was a pragmatic accommodation, recognizing, in somewhat 
oxymoronic fashion, that such territories would be part of the United States, but 
would remain “foreign . . . in a domestic sense.”52 The new imperial doctrine 
                                                                                                                 
 
 47. The cases falling under the heading of “the Insular Cases” is a contested issue. Some 
commentators include only the cases decided in 1901; others reach as far forward as Balzac v. 
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). See Christina Duffy Burnett, A Note on the Insular Cases, in 
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 
389, 389–92 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001). We use the term to 
describe the constitutional cases beginning in 1901 and ending with Balzac in 1922. Primarily, 
we refer to Balzac; Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 
197 (1903); and Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
 48. See, e.g., Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312–13 (“The guaranties of certain fundamental personal 
rights declared in the Constitution, as for instance, that no person could be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law, had from the beginning full application in the 
Philippines and [Puerto] Rico . . . .”). 
 49. 182 U.S. at 287. 
 50. Id. at 300 (White, J., concurring). 
 51. Id. at 311. 
 52. Id. at 341. For elaborate discussion of the paradoxes in the early treatment of the newly 
acquired territories, see FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, 
AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001). 
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reflected in the Insular Cases showed a distinctive constitutional tolerance for 
particularized territorial arrangements, one that allowed for fundamental ambiguity 
in legal status. But however tolerant (or intolerant) the constitutional doctrine may 
have been after the United States took control of Puerto Rico in 1898, there was no 
escaping the practical reality that Puerto Rico was wholly subordinate to the U.S. 
government. Indeed, from the ratification of the Treaty of Paris in 1898 until the 
Elective Governor Act of 1947,53 the Governor and Executive Council (the 
equivalent of a state senate) of Puerto Rico were entirely appointed by the U.S. 
federal government.54  
The second period emerged with the global anticolonial movements that 
mushroomed during and after World War II. The changed international landscape, 
the Cold War, and the emergence of a nonaligned bloc of independent states acting 
as members of the United Nations all made continued colonial prerogatives an 
international liability for the United States. Here, the defining legal act was Public 
Law 600,55 approved by Congress in 1952, which “was intended to end [Puerto 
Rico’s] subordinate status.”56 Public Law 600 set out the terms of a collaboration 
between Puerto Rico and the United States: Congress set out a process for Puerto 
Ricans to write their own constitution, elect representatives to govern local affairs, 
and create a bill of rights, but Puerto Ricans drafted the constitution proper. As its 
legislative history makes clear, Public Law 600 was a “reaffirmation by the Congress 
of the self-government principle.”57 The preamble to the bill describes Public Law 
600 as the culmination of a “series of enactments [that] progressively recognized the 
right of self-government of the People of Puerto Rico.”58  
Indeed, after Congress passed Public Law 600, Puerto Ricans voted on whether 
to accept it in an island-wide referendum before proceeding to do any constitution 
writing at all.59 After Public Law 600 gained popular approval from Puerto Ricans, 
a constitutional convention was convened whose proposed constitutional text was 
approved by a second referendum. Congress may have initiated the constitution-
writing process, but the voters of Puerto Rico made it a reality. Since that time, apart 
from some initial and inevitable tweaks as the constitution “settled in,” the people of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. Elective Governor Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-362, 61 Stat. 770 (1947).  
 54. See The Foraker Act, Pub. L. No. 56-191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900). 
 55. Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 (1950). 
 56. Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 
36, 40 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 57. H.R. REP. NO. 81-2275, at 6 (1950). But see Juan R. Torruella, Why Puerto Rico Does 
Not Need Further Experimentation with Its Future: A Reply to the Notion of “Territorial 
Federalism,” 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 65, 77–84 (2018) (arguing the history of Public Law 600 
suggests it was not intended to alter the political relationship between Puerto Rico and the 
United States). 
 58. Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, pmbl., 64 Stat. 319, 
319 (1950). 
 59. Salvador E. Casellas, Commonwealth Status and the Federal Courts, 80 REVISTA 
JURÍDICA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO RICO [REV. JUR. U.P.R.] 945, 949 (2011) (“Public Law 600 
did not come fully into force until its acceptance by the Puerto Rican people in an island-wide 
referendum.”). 
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Puerto Rico have exercised complete control over the constitutional form of 
governance.60 
Public Law 600 and the Puerto Rican Constitution reframed the relationship 
between the United States and Puerto Rico using terms of consent.61 Indeed, the law’s 
first enacting clause declares that “fully recognizing the principle of government by 
consent, this Act is now adopted in the nature of a compact so that the people of 
Puerto Rico may organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own 
adoption.”62 In the first federal court opinion to interpret Puerto Rico’s status after 
Congress approved the Puerto Rico Constitution, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Puerto Rico held that “Puerto Rico is, under the terms of the compact, 
sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution of the United States.”63 In 
reaching this conclusion, the court looked not only to Public Law 600’s legislative 
history but also to the international law obligations of the United States to the 
colonial deaccession mandates of the United Nations.64 After the passage of Public 
Law 600, the United States ceased reporting on Puerto Rico to the United Nations 
under Article 73(e) of the U.N. Charter (which pertained to “non-self-governing 
territories”),65 a change in status accepted in turn by the U.N. General Assembly.66 
The result, as recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. Popular 
                                                                                                                 
 
 60. The Senate chronicles the interaction between Public Law 600 and the Puerto Rican 
Constitution in S. REP. NO. 82-1720, at 3 (1952). 
 61. José Trías Monge, Plenary Power and the Principle of Liberty: An Alternative View 
of the Political Conditions of Puerto Rico, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1, 28 (1999) (“[T]here was 
indeed a change in the relationship [between Puerto Rico and the United States]. The principle 
of consent, fully recognized in the first section of Public Law 600, provides the key to 
understanding the nature of the change. The change did not alone consist in the obtention [sic] 
of a fuller measure of self-government, but particularly in the fact that such consent became 
the new basis of the relationship.”). But see Torruella, supra note 57, at 81–84. According to 
Judge Torruella, the themes of Puerto Rican autonomy in Public Law 600, and in subsequent 
representations to the United Nations, were a “monumental hoax” concocted for the immediate 
political advantage of the American government. Id. at 85–88. Whether the representations of 
Puerto Rican autonomy were genuine or not, we argue below that those representations 
themselves had real consequences that constrain American abuse of power in relations with 
Puerto Rico moving forward.  
 62. Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act § 1, 64 Stat. at 319 (emphasis added).  
 63. Mora v. Mejias, 115 F. Supp. 610, 612 (D.P.R. 1953). 
 64. Id. 
 65. The impetus behind Puerto Rico’s removal began in a letter from Governor Muñoz 
Marín to President Truman requesting it. This and a fuller history behind Public Law 600, the 
transition to local self-rule, and the removal of Puerto Rico from the list of non-self-governing 
territories are laid out in substantial detail in JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS 
OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD 119–140 (1997) and Chimène I. Keitner, From 
Conquest to Consent: Puerto Rico and the Prospect of Genuine Free Association, in 
RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 77 
(Gerald L. Neuman & Tomiko Brown-Nagin eds., 2015). 
 66. G.A. Res. 748 (VIII) (Nov. 27, 1953). The General Assembly found that the people 
of Puerto Rico “ha[d] achieved a new constitutional status.” Id. at 26; see also U.N. Charter 
art. 73, ¶ e. (regulating “non-self-governing territories”).  
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Democratic Party, is that “Puerto Rico . . . is an autonomous political entity, 
‘sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution.’”67 
This second constitutional period of mixed sovereignty proved serviceable, if 
underspecified. As we shall address subsequently, the redefinition of Puerto Rican 
governance ushered in a period of economic expansion under beneficial U.S. tax 
regulations. On the political front, the broad popular mandate for the new system of 
self-rule engendered by the Puerto Rican referenda on both Public Law 600 and the 
Puerto Rico Constitution allowed the arrangement to satisfy the anticolonialist tenor 
of the times and allowed the federal government to put a stop to persistent United 
Nations efforts to embarrass the United States for its territorial holdings. After Public 
Law 600 was enacted and a Puerto Rican Constitution approved by Congress and the 
Puerto Rican constitutional convention, the United States requested that Puerto Rico 
be removed from the United Nation’s list of Non-Self-Governing Territories and that 
the United States be relieved of its U.N. obligation to continue transmitting 
information on it.68 In response, the General Assembly voted in 1953 to remove 
Puerto Rico from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories and relieve the United 
States of its reporting obligations.69  
Public Law 600’s development of Puerto Rican “sovereignty” of a contingent and 
limited sort proved to be not so much a coherent conceptual structure than an 
example of what Felix Frankfurter long ago referred to as “inventive 
statesmanship.”70 The accommodation allowed both continued U.S. command of 
Puerto Rico’s international affairs and a strong measure of democratic legitimacy for 
the island’s political self-governance. But without the overlay of popular sovereignty 
among Puerto Ricans, the commonwealth enterprise would be revealed as “a 
monumental hoax,” as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit memorably 
declaimed in its first substantive examination of Puerto Rico’s status after the 
enactment of Public Law 600.71 
Yet “inventive statesmanship” has started to appear a “monumental hoax” under 
the pressure of the apparently uncoordinated but no less real efforts by the three 
branches of the U.S. government to erode the foundations of the second twentieth 
century constitutional accommodation, through recent repudiations by the Executive 
Branch, destabilizing decisions of the Supreme Court, and, as we shall see, a 
congressional enactment, Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic 
Stability Act (PROMESA), that placed the island under an unprecedented form of 
fiscal receivership.72 All have done so under what we maintain is a limited 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. 457 U.S. 1, 8 (1982) (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 
663, 673 (1974)). 
 68. See supra note 65. 
 69. See supra note 66. 
 70. See Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter, Law Officer, Dep’t of War, to Henry 
Stimson, Sec’y of War (Mar. 11, 1914) [hereinafter Frankfurter Memorandum] (quoted in 
Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309, 319 (D.P.R. 1953), aff’d sub nom. Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 
377 (1st Cir. 1953)). At the time, Frankfurter was the law officer of the Department of War, 
which exercised jurisdiction over Puerto Rico. 
 71. Figueroa v. Puerto Rico, 232 F.2d 615, 620 (1st Cir. 1956). 
 72. See infra Part IV. 
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understanding of the Territory Clause of the Constitution and what it permits or 
compels in terms of local governance. 
Taken as a package, federal action has forced a reexamination of the constitutional 
relation between the United States and Puerto Rico. We reiterate that were the people 
of Puerto Rico to claim independence or were the United States to offer statehood, 
these constitutional issues could be avoided. Absent such fundamental change, 
however, some of the premises of the two constitutional periods need to be revisited. 
We undertake to do so and find ourselves oddly drawn to the structural logic of some 
of the Insular Cases, hard as it may be to distance ourselves from the imperial and 
racialist rhetoric of the day.  
II. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH REBELS 
Over the last three decades, the Department of Justice and three presidential 
administrations have taken the position that the commonwealth arrangement with 
Puerto Rico confers no special rights of self-governance. Allowing for some 
variations in presentation, the basic theme has been that Puerto Rico’s designation as 
a commonwealth is simply a delegation of governing authority under the Territory 
Clause, pursuant to which Congress has plenary authority over Puerto Rico—
meaning that it could unilaterally abrogate such an arrangement at any time.73 
Despite Public Law 600 being made “in the nature of a compact,”74 and 
accompanying representations to the United Nations that the Puerto Rico 
Commonwealth arrangement could only be modified by mutual consent,75 the 
Executive Branch has come to argue that such an option is constitutionally 
impossible.76 The argument turns on two maxims. First, the sole constitutional 
authority for the United States to have any relation with Puerto Rico is the Territory 
Clause of the Constitution, which confers on Congress the “Power to dispose of and 
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States.”77 Second, there may be no conferral of any binding 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. Or, as a federal judge memorably put it, albeit in a different context, “to paraphrase 
the scripture: the Congress giveth, and the Congress taketh away.” Senate Select Comm. on 
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1973).  
 74. Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, § 1, 64 Stat. 319, 319 
(1950). 
 75. See, e.g., Frances P. Bolton, U.S. Representative to the Gen. Assembly, Statement to 
U.N. Committee IV (Trusteeship) (Nov. 3, 1953), reprinted in 29 DEP’T ST. BULL. 802, 804 
(1953) (describing the accord as “a compact of a bilateral nature whose terms may be changed 
only by common consent”); Press Release No. 1741, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 
Statement by Mr. Mason Sears, U.S. Representative in the Comm. on Info. from Non-Self 
Governing Territories 2 (Aug. 28, 1953) (“[A] compact cannot be denounced by either party 
unless it has the permission of the other.”); JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF 
THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD 123–24 (1997) (collecting statements by U.S. officials to 
similar effect). 
 76. See, e.g., REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON PUERTO RICO’S STATUS 5–8 
(2007) [hereinafter 2007 REPORT]; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 15, Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. ___ (2016) (No. 15-
108) (opinion reported at 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016)).  
 77. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
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special status on Puerto Rico because of the old truism that one Congress cannot bind 
another.  
The two propositions are in tension with each other. The ability of Congress 
pursuant to the Territory Clause to “dispose of” territory or property of the United 
States grants textual authority to any Congress to make a final and irrevocable 
decision to remove a tract of land (or any other property, for that matter) from the 
sovereignty and jurisdiction of the federal government. Once a Congress has 
disposed of a territory, of necessity it binds future Congresses to the consequences 
of that decision. Thus, for example, the United States in 1946 entered into a treaty 
with the newly formed government of the Philippines that recognized the 
independence of the new territory and limited American interests to the use of 
military bases there.78 Once duly authorized by Congress and incorporated into a 
treaty, there could be no question that future Congresses would be “bound” by the 
fact that the Philippines was no longer an American possession.  
Nonetheless, an atextual hands-tying view of the Territory Clause took hold in the 
Executive Branch in the 1990s, with its first articulation in a 1994 Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) opinion on the constitutionality of a “mutual consent provision” in 
proposed legislation for a commonwealth agreement between the United States and 
Guam, another unincorporated territory of the United States. Much as with Puerto 
Rico after Public Law 600, the question was whether the agreement with Guam could 
give legal force to the requirement of consent from each of Guam and the federal 
government before alterations in the commonwealth agreement could come into 
effect. The OLC opinion noted the inconsistent views of the Department of Justice 
on such provisions, including an opinion approved by then-Assistant Attorney 
General William Rehnquist that sanctioned the inclusion of such a provision in the 
Covenant with the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.79 OLC 
nonetheless rejected these views, laying out a series of propositions that the 
Executive Branch has followed ever since. First, OLC declared all sovereign territory 
in the United States is either a part of a State, or it is not. If it is not, then Congress 
exercises “plenary” authority over that area until it “becomes a State or ceases to be 
under United States sovereignty.”80 This plenary authority could not be alienated or 
delegated in such a way as to deprive later Congresses of the very same authority 
over the territories.81  
While the original 1994 memo dealt with Guam, its uncompromising logic carried 
over to Puerto Rico, the territory whose legal and political status had been most often 
and most contentiously engaged.82 The Department of Justice reiterated an absolutist, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. Treaty of General Relations Between the United States of America and the Republic 
of the Philippines, Phil.-U.S., July 4, 1946, 61 Stat. 1174. 
 79. Mut. Consent Provisions in the Guam Commonwealth Legislation, Op. O.L.C. 1, 1 & 
n.2 (1994) [hereinafter OLC Guam Memo], http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc 
/opinions/attachments/2014/11/10/1994-07-28-mutual-consent-guam.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/MN9F-C2PN]; see also Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands in Political Union with the United States of America, Pub. L. No. 94-241, § 105, 90 
Stat. 263, 264 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012)) (mutual consent provision).  
 80. OLC Guam Memo, supra note 79, at 2–5. 
 81. See id. at 4–5.  
 82. Indeed, it seems that the reconsideration of the Department’s views on the subject 
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no-sovereignty view on Puerto Rico in 2001 in a letter to the Senate Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources concerning potential political status options for Puerto 
Rico. The letter underscores that the “terms of the Constitution do not contemplate 
an option other than sovereign independence, statehood, or territorial status.”83 
Again, the assumption was territorial status could not allow anything but unilateral 
congressional command, without any legal weight given to any required consent on 
the part of Puerto Rico. 
These arguments were taken up by the Task Forces on Puerto Rico’s Status under 
both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. The reports issued by the task 
forces have challenged the available options for the creation of a bilateral agreement 
from the U.S. side. The 2005 report found that “Puerto Rico is, for purposes under 
the U.S. Constitution, ‘a territory,’”84 and the 2011 Task Force affirmed that Puerto 
Rico is “subject to the Territory Clause of the U.S. Constitution.”85 Both task forces 
relied on the maxim that one Congress cannot bind a subsequent Congress and thus 
“cannot restrict a future Congress from revising a delegation to a territory of powers 
of self-government.”86 The OLC has also insisted on the “rule” that one Congress 
may not bind another, using it to conclude that mutual consent provisions are “legally 
unenforceable.”87 Consequently, both the Obama and Bush administrations 
contended Congress has the power unilaterally to alter the United States’ relationship 
with Puerto Rico, and that any restriction of that authority would be unconstitutional.  
The Department of Justice laid out its most forceful and aggressive articulation of 
Puerto Rico’s straitened political status—and impliedly, the instability of the 
commonwealth arrangement—in its amicus briefing and argument before the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle.88 Here the Solicitor General argued 
that “[t]he Constitution affords no independent political status to territories but 
instead confirms that they are under the sovereignty of the United States and subject 
to the plenary authority of Congress.”89 The brief further characterized the Puerto 
Rico Constitution as being adopted only because Congress “permitted the people of 
Puerto Rico to adopt” it, arguing that neither this nor subsequent history altered 
“Puerto Rico’s constitutional status as a U.S. territory.”90 “That arrangement can be 
revised by Congress . . . [t]he ultimate source of sovereign power in Puerto Rico thus 
                                                                                                                 
 
were prompted by legislation dealing with Puerto Rico. See id. at 1 n.2 (“The Department 
revisited this issue in the early 1990’s in connection with the Puerto Rico Status Referendum 
Bill . . . .”).  
 83. Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Senator 
Frank H. Murkowski, Chairman, Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res. 5 (Jan. 18, 2001), in 
Appendix E of REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON PUERTO RICO’S STATUS (2005) 
[hereinafter 2005 REPORT]. 
 84. 2005 REPORT, supra note 83, at 5. The Task Force adds that “[f]or entities under the 
sovereignty of the United States, the only constitutional options are to be a State or 
[T]erritory.” Id. at 6. 
 85. 2011 REPORT, supra note 27, at 26 (“[Mutual consent] provisions would not be 
enforceable because a future Congress could choose to alter that relationship unilaterally.”). 
 86. 2005 REPORT, supra note 83, at 6; see also 2011 REPORT, supra note 27, at 26. 
 87. OLC Guam Memo, supra note 79, at 2, 5. 
 88. Brief for the United States, supra note 76. 
 89. Id. at 7. 
 90. Id. at 7–8. 
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remains the United States.”91 This is the first court filing by the Department of Justice 
in recent history to take so emphatic a position on Puerto Rico’s political status. 
In rejecting any legal significance to the ratification of the commonwealth 
compact by a referendum of Puerto Ricans, much as the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Sanchez Valle would go on to do,92 the government’s filing returned reflexively to 
Congress’s ability unilaterally to abrogate the island’s self-government at its 
pleasure:  
[The Commonwealth negotiations and adoption] were of profound 
significance for the relationship between the United States and Puerto 
Rico, but they did not alter Puerto Rico’s constitutional status as a U.S. 
territory. The United States did not cede its sovereignty over Puerto Rico 
by admitting it as a State or granting it independence. Rather, Congress 
authorized Puerto Rico to exercise governance over local affairs. That 
arrangement can be revised by Congress, and federal and Puerto Rico 
officials understood that Puerto Rico’s adoption of a constitution did not 
change its constitutional status.93 
Setting aside the irony that “adoption of a constitution” did not, in the eyes of the 
federal government, change a community’s “constitutional status,” the brief argues 
that the “compact” (the government’s quotation marks) was “an agreement that 
Congress would permit self-government if the people of Puerto Rico drafted a 
constitution and Congress approved it . . . . Congress retained the authority to approve 
or disapprove the constitution and reaffirmed that it could legislate for Puerto Rico 
in the future.”94 The brief repeatedly hammered home the supposedly absolute nature 
of congressional power to govern Puerto Rico and, consequently, how ineffectual the 
commonwealth compact was to protect Puerto Rico from plenary congressional 
control.95 
The Executive Branch’s arguments on the status of Puerto Rico rest on two 
arguments: first, that the Territory Clause of the Constitution is the sole textual 
foundation for the exercise of any form of American sovereignty over an acquired 
area that is not a state; and, second, that any congressional enactment cannot purport 
to bind a future Congress. The constitutional question is whether either proposition, 
alone or in combination, compels a conclusion that Puerto Rico lacks any attribute 
of sovereign authority under the commonwealth compact memorialized in Public 
Law 600.  
Certainly, the Territory Clause may serve as the source of congressional authority 
to act under a Constitution of limited and enumerated powers. But we return to the 
persistent issue in constitutionalizing the acquisitions of the Spanish-American War: 
whether the source of Congress’s authority in the Territory Clause does or does not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. Id. at 8. 
 92. 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2016) (holding that Puerto Rico was not a separate sovereign 
for double jeopardy purposes, notwithstanding the “constitutional developments . . . of great 
significance”). 
 93. Brief for the United States, supra note 76, at 7–8 (emphasis added). 
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 95. See id. at 24–27.  
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predetermine the options Congress has before it as it pursues “inventive 
statesmanship.”96 The original understanding of the Territory Clause anticipated 
western expansion of the new republic and the status of territory as an interim 
measure along the path to statehood.97 But, as recognized in the Insular Cases and 
on forward, the textual source of constitutional authority for territorial expansion 
does not in itself prescribe any particular political arrangement in the acquired 
territory.  
Indeed, the doctrinal innovation of incorporated versus unincorporated territories 
was a response to the imperial acquisitions of the late nineteenth century.98 Painful 
to recall is the question presented to the Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, which 
turned on whether Congress had authority under the Territory Clause to legislate 
conditions for territories acquired after the adoption of the Federal Constitution.99 In 
finding that Congress lacked the capacity to hold territories as a federal protectorate, 
Dred Scott relied on the conventional understanding that any territories “should be 
disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, and be settled and formed 
into distinct republican States, which should become members of the Federal Union, 
and have the same rights of sovereignty, and freedom, and independence, as other 
States.”100 For the antebellum Court, the congressional authority to define the 
conditions of governance in the territories was inextricably intertwined with the 
power to dispose of the territories for the common good of the States––as opposed 
to holding them in some form of federal usufruct.101 Indeed, the power to dispose 
comes before the power to “make needful Rules and Regulations” for the territories 
in the text of the Territory Clause. 
This part of the Dred Scott holding also did not survive the Civil War. One of the 
central doctrinal innovations of the Insular Cases was precisely the recognition of an 
expanded ambit of federal authority on terms beyond the original text. Thus, in the 
specific case of Puerto Rico, the Territory Clause historically has permitted both 
governance by a military commander and by an elected governor, with no alteration 
of the formal foundation for the arrangement within American constitutional law. 
The text of the Clause may in fact be read to anticipate such flexibility as the power 
of Congress to “dispose of” a “Territory,” a concept that Dred Scott struggled to 
define. Further, as noted, “dispose of” also implies that power of Congress to act 
definitively by taking an action it cannot undo—it would be an odd definition of the 
word “dispose” that did not impliedly accept that one Congress was undoing a prior 
act.102 As Felix Frankfurter recognized a century ago, the Territory Clause permits 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. Frankfurter Memorandum, supra note 70, at 3.  
 97. See BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
AMERICAN EMPIRE 14–29 (2006) (describing the United States’ pattern of territorial expansion 
in the nineteenth century). 
 98. See Russell Rennie, Note, A Qualified Defense of the Insular Cases, 92 N.Y.U.  L. 
REV. 1683, 1688–93 (2017). 
     99.   60 U.S. 393, 432 (1857).  
 100. Id. at 433. 
 101. Id. at 440–41. 
 102. The phrase “to dispose of” appears nowhere else in the Constitution, but at the time 
the Constitution was drafted, the phrase had already taken on its modern definition of “to get 
rid of, to get done with, settle, finish.” See Dispose, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, 
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“working out, step by step, forms of government for our Insular possessions 
responsive to the largest needs and capacities of their inhabitants, and ascertained by 
the best wisdom of Congress.”103 
Similarly, the hollow truism that one Congress may not bind another does nothing 
to distinguish the Territory Clause from the Treaty Clause, which is the source of 
authority for the President to make agreements with foreign sovereigns subject to 
approval by two-thirds of the Senate. Treaties, like the commonwealth compact, are 
in principle subject to subsequent revocation. So too is any domestic legislation 
subject to subsequent repeal, even if the decision to expand the military or provide 
additional prescription drug benefits to older Americans might saddle subsequent 
Congresses with costly budgetary constraints.104 Indeed, any congressional action 
can in theory always be undone. But that one Congress can undo the work of another 
does not address the binding external consequences of entering into a compact, 
ratifying a treaty, or simply repealing a law. Nor can it stand for the proposition that 
the domestic constitutional arrangements of the United States somehow forbid any 
senate from ratifying a mutually beneficial, forward-looking treaty, simply because 
subsequent events might require it to be undone.105 The executive’s retreat from the 
opportunities and nuances of Public Law 600—evidenced in the OLC opinions of 
the last two decades, and DOJ’s recent litigating positions embodying those OLC 
opinions—rejects Frankfurter’s inventive statesmanship in favor of a reductive 
formalism that, as we explain below, would soon be matched by the other branches.  
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III. SUPREME COURT FORMALISM 
For decades, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that Puerto Rico, 
“like a state, is an autonomous political entity.”106 As the Court has chronicled many 
times, Puerto Rico’s “demand[] for greater autonomy” led Congress to pass Public 
Law 600 and Puerto Rico to enact its own Constitution;107 with that constitution, 
Puerto Rico gained “the degree of autonomy and independence normally associated 
with States of the Union.”108 Yet the Court’s recent decisions in Puerto Rico v. 
Sanchez Valle109 and Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust110 retreated 
to a different, more formalist understanding of Puerto Rico’s sovereignty status, 
much in keeping with the position advocated by the Executive Branch.  
In Sanchez Valle, the Court held that Puerto Rico—unlike a state—is not a 
separate sovereign for purposes of the double jeopardy clause, consequently 
diminishing its power to enforce criminal law. In Franklin Trust, the Court held that 
Puerto Rico was a state for purposes of the preemption provision in Chapter 9 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, thereby eliminating Puerto Rico’s ability to restructure its 
insolvent public utilities. Taken together, the two decisions sharply constrict the 
autonomous governance domain of the Commonwealth. 
At least on the surface, the Court did not suddenly forget its decades of 
jurisprudence recognizing Puerto Rico’s sovereignty; the Court dutifully marched 
through the requisite rhetoric of Puerto Rican autonomy.111 Yet both decisions 
treated Puerto Rico’s fundamental constitutional transformation after 1950 as 
nothing more than a data point—and sometimes an irrelevant one—in the 
interpretive task at hand. In especially Sanchez Valle but also in Franklin Trust, the 
Court’s decision was based on a refusal to recognize the genesis of Puerto Rico’s 
sovereignty in the constitutional transformation of the mid-twentieth century. As the 
Court described its inherited test in Sanchez Valle, “the inquiry (despite its label) 
does not probe whether a government possesses the usual attributes, or acts in the 
common manner, of a sovereign entity.”112  
Instead, the Court’s historic test for double jeopardy focused on the moment of 
incorporation to American law, regardless of any intervening change in status.113 
Under this approach, a jurisdiction’s status at the time of legal affiliation with the 
United States would forever define its status, unless there were a formal cessation of 
affiliation (as with the Philippines) or formal integration as a state of the Union. That 
test, as the Court described, has been modestly serviceable in criminal law.114 But it 
                                                                                                                 
 
 106. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 8 (1982) (citing Calero-Toledo 
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does nothing to recognize the capacity of a relationship between sovereign entities 
to be constitutionally transformed. 
Sanchez Valle dramatizes the problems with the Court’s jurisprudence most 
clearly. The case began when Luis Sanchez Valle sold weapons to undercover 
officers; while criminal charges under Puerto Rico law were pending, a federal grand 
jury based in Puerto Rico indicted him for violating federal law.115 Sanchez Valle 
invoked the dual sovereignty doctrine to halt prosecution in the courts of Puerto Rico 
on double jeopardy grounds. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, a defendant may 
only be subject to successive prosecutions for “a single act” if that offense “violates 
the laws of separate sovereigns.”116  
The critical issue before the Court turned on whether Puerto Rico—like a state 
—is a separate sovereign or is simply a subordinate entity of the United States. As a 
technical matter under the inherited criminal law doctrine of dual sovereignty, the 
term “sovereignty” loses all of its conventional meaning in favor of a stylized inquiry 
as to how that entity came to be within the United States.117 Sovereignty is defined 
for these purposes as the state in which the subnational entity entered into relations 
with the United States, rather than as any kind of functional assessment of the powers 
exercised by the respective political jurisdictions. Whether a political entity is 
sovereign depends on whether their political powers derive from the same “ultimate 
source.”118 The Court is clear the inquiry is “historical, not functional”—to determine 
whether Puerto Rico is a separate sovereign from the United States requires “looking 
at the deepest wellsprings, not the current exercise, of prosecutorial authority.”119 
The Court stressed the importance of going back to the historical origin of sovereign 
power, looking for “primeval” sources of authority,120 discerning sovereignty as “an 
original matter,”121 and seeking the “furthest-back source of prosecutorial power.”122  
Using this “historical” test, the Court found the “ultimate” source of Puerto Rico’s 
sovereignty (or, as the Court narrowed the phrase, Puerto Rico’s “prosecutorial 
power”) was the United States:  
Congress, in Public Law 600, authorized Puerto Rico’s constitution-
making process in the first instance; the people of a territory could not 
legally have initiated that process on their own. And Congress, in later 
legislation, both amended the draft charter and gave it the indispensable 
stamp of approval; popular ratification, however meaningful, could not 
have turned the convention’s handiwork into law. Put simply, Congress 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. Id. at 1869–70. A second petitioner, Jaime Gomez Vazquez, had his case joined with 
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 116. Id. at 1867 (emphasis added).  
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conferred the authority to create the Puerto Rico Constitution, which in 
turn confers the authority to bring criminal charges.123 
Locating the source of Puerto Rico’s “sovereignty” in the U.S. Congress gives 
ample support to the old adage that “history is written by the victors.” Without much 
explanation, the Court located the “origin” of Puerto Rico at the moment the United 
States colonized Puerto Rico. By the Court’s logic, Puerto Rico derives its 
prosecutorial power from the Puerto Rico Constitution, which is in turned authorized 
by Congress; Congress has authority over Puerto Rico as a result of the 1898 Treaty 
of Paris (which ended the Spanish-American War).124 The only further defense the 
Supreme Court gives of its choice to begin the story of Puerto Rican autonomy at the 
Spanish-American War is that, going back one step further, Puerto Rico was just a 
Spanish colony: “[N]o one argues that when the United States gained possession of 
Puerto Rico, its people possessed independent prosecutorial power, in the way that 
the States or tribes did upon becoming part of this country. Puerto Rico was until 
then a colony ‘under Spanish sovereignty.’”125 The Court seems to suggest that, since 
Puerto Rico was already colonized when it came into U.S. possession, it was 
ultimately, originally a colony.  
All of this reasoning is question-begging. If the moment of origin is set at the 
moment of colonization, then of course Puerto Rico would not be a separate 
sovereign under any definition, for the reason that it was subject to a brutal military 
occupation. But why set the origin moment at the arrival of the gunboats in the first 
place? When Columbus voyaged West in the late fifteenth century, for example, the 
Borinquen Taínos had already established a thriving society on the islands that make 
up what is now modern-day Puerto Rico, and that society already had a sophisticated 
legal system.126 This system included “prosecutorial power”: under Taíno law, 
village chiefs could condemn their subjects to death (after following particular 
procedures), an exercise of “prosecutorial power” that not only predates Congress’s 
first grant of power to Puerto Rico but predates Congress (even the Continental 
Congress) itself, and does so by at least 700 years.127  
Like Native Americans—whose sovereignty the Court recognizes predates their 
encounter with the United States—Puerto Rican sovereignty predates conquest, 
whether by Spaniards or Americans; Justice Thomas’s separate concurrence in 
Sanchez Valle expressing discomfort with extending sovereignty to Native 
Americans underlined that the Court was well aware that using a slightly wider 
historical lens would reveal an alternative source of sovereignty even under the 
Court’s crabbed definition of the term.128 
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This historical “furthest-back” inquiry is its own reductio ad absurdum. The 
Taínos had sovereignty over the landmass of Puerto Rico before the Spanish, but 
humans have inhabited the island as early as 2000 BCE.129 Would the Court’s 
“historical” inquiry be satisfied by this “furthest-back,” or is there further yet to 
go?130 In dissent, Justice Breyer highlights this “conceptual” problem by explaining 
the Court could also trace Puerto Rico’s sovereignty back to Spain then Rome then 
Justinian, or trace the United States’ sovereignty to Parliament or William the 
Conqueror or King Arthur.131 Given the gaping leaps in logic, one would have 
expected a deeper conceptual defense of the Court’s cramped original position 
doctrine. Instead, the Court acknowledged that it has:  
[N]ever explained its reasons for adopting this historical approach to the 
dual-sovereignty doctrine. It may appear counter-intuitive, even 
legalistic, as compared to an inquiry focused on a governmental entity’s 
functional autonomy. But that alternative would raise serious problems 
of application. It would require deciding exactly how much autonomy is 
sufficient for separate sovereignty . . . .132  
The Court’s turn to formalism does not detract from the stark reality that the 
historical test the court settles for raises precisely the same “serious problems of 
application” of its own—what suffices for original “prosecutorial authority,” and 
how much is sufficient for separate sovereignty? And how far back must that 
“prosecutorial authority” go to establish its separateness? One can contrast the 
formalism of Sanchez Valle to the Court’s functional approach to the status of 
Guantánamo, another kind of “territory” subject to the rule of Congress, in the series 
of post-September 11th cases culminating in Boumediene v. United States.133 
As Justice Breyer points out in his dissent to Sanchez Valle, the “furthest-back” 
historical inquiry is symptomatic of a larger theoretical problem with the Court’s 
reasoning: the “ultimate” source of Puerto Rico’s “prosecutorial authority” or 
sovereignty writ large cannot be found by going further and further back.134 In the 
developments between 1950 and 1952, Puerto Rico’s adoption of a Constitution by 
and for the people marked a qualitative shift in Puerto Rico’s political status 
including its “prosecutorial authority” and, indeed, its “sovereignty” as that term is 
commonly understood. After all, the U.S. Constitution does not, in the final analysis, 
draw its moral or political authority from the legal recognition of American 
independence in the 1783 Treaty of Paris, or even from the Articles of Confederation, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. ROUSE, supra note 126, at 69, 106–07 (noting the Ortoiroid Indians began migrating 
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but rather from “We the People.” As there, so here: the provenance of Puerto Rico’s 
prosecutorial authority and its sovereignty is its Constitution, which, just like the 
U.S. Constitution, declares that it ultimately draws authority from its people.135   
At root, the question unanswered by the Supreme Court remains why the creation 
of the Puerto Rico Constitution, by the popular consent of the residents of Puerto 
Rico, did not create “the ‘ultimate source’”136 of sovereignty for modern Puerto 
Rico—especially when that popular consent was accompanied by consent from the 
original colonizing entity (the U.S. federal government). Does the Court really want 
to hold that sovereignty can be vested at the moment of conquest and not 
subsequently assumed by the democratic undertaking of “We the People,” of the 
United States in general and those U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico in particular?  
Puerto Rico’s Constitution culminated a process of both a reorganization of the 
terms by which the United States organized legal authority over its territory and the 
role of the Puerto Rican people in self-government. It was both a new compact with 
the United States and what Bruce Ackerman has called a transformative 
“constitutional moment.”137 For Ackerman, such moments alter the fundamental 
understanding of constitutional power in which “[d]ecisions by the People . . .  under 
special constitutional conditions” take on a new legal dimension above and beyond 
the formal textual commands. Certainly, Ackerman’s conditions for such moments 
appear satisfied in Puerto Rico—a supermajority of people must support the 
fundamental change to the nature of government, and they must convince or defeat 
opponents through deliberation on the merits.138 This is precisely what happened in 
Puerto Rico between 1950 and 1952, as decisive majorities of Puerto Rico residents 
(76.5% of voters and 81.9% of voters, respectively) approved Public Law 600 and 
the Puerto Rico Constitution,139 while Congress (representing the rest of the 
American people) overwhelmingly endorsed both acts as well.140 
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One need not accept Ackerman’s account of constitutional transformations to 
recognize that a fundamental change occurred through the decisions of Congress and 
Puerto Rico that the popular will of the people of Puerto Rico would be honored in 
relations going forward. This process of popular consent was the most significant 
modern turning point in U.S.-Puerto Rico relations. Put simply, Public Law 600141 
“was intended to end” Puerto Rico’s “subordinate status”142 and, as a matter of 
constitutional fact, ought to have done so. 
The Court’s decision in Sanchez Valle missed the critical significance of Public 
Law 600. Puerto Rico was endowed by an act of Congress with the power to 
determine its own political fate. The holding of a referendum on political status was 
an act of what classic constitutional theory would term “constituent power.”143 As 
expounded in the classic account of modern state formation by the Abbé Emmanuel 
Joseph Sieyès, there is a distinction drawn between the authority to decide on a 
constitutional order and the manner in which that power is constituted ultimately.144 
The authority to make that choice is an attribute of sovereignty reserved to the 
constituent power, in this case the critical decisions by the citizens of Puerto Rico to 
enter into this new relationship by overwhelmingly endorsing their new 
constitutional arrangements in 1952. The constituent power for the new 
commonwealth arrangement was exercised in the decision of the people of Puerto 
Rico to take the first affirmative steps of adopting the formal relationship with the 
United States. The Court in Sanchez Valle offered no account of why sovereign status 
could not emerge during the reformulation of political relations as part of the process 
of decolonization.  
Further, the Court did not explain why it rejected congressional intent in altering 
the relation between the United States and Puerto Rico. As its legislative history 
makes clear, Public Law 600 was a “reaffirmation by the Congress of the self-
government principle.”145 Even if one were to reject legislative history as a legitimate 
ground for judicial decision-making, Public Law 600’s enacted preamble (which is 
broadly agreed to be acceptable grounds for judicial interpretation of a statute)146 
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describes Public Law 600 as the culmination of a “series of enactments [that] 
progressively recognized the right of self-government of the people of Puerto 
Rico.”147 Even in the absence of these statements, however, is the political reality that 
after Congress passed the law, Puerto Ricans voted on whether to accept it in an 
island-wide referendum before proceeding to any constitution writing at all.148 After 
Public Law 600 gained popular approval, Puerto Rico convened a constitutional 
convention whose proposed constitutional plan was approved by a second 
referendum. Congress may have initiated the constitution-writing process, but the 
voters of Puerto Rico made it a reality.149  
The path from Public Law 600 to the Puerto Rican Constitution similarly renders 
all “sources of authority” predating that organic shift open to reexamination, if not 
outright obsolete. Seemingly, the Court had adopted this reasoning in Examining 
Board of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero,150 which recognized 
that Puerto Rico has “a relationship to the United States that has no parallel in our 
history”—a point the Court acknowledged in Sanchez Valle.151 Yet, the majority of 
the Court rejected petitioner’s claim that “Puerto Rico’s transformative constitutional 
moment” was controlling on the grounds that it only revealed “immediate,” not 
“ultimate,” historical authority.152 But why Spain’s act of conquest trumps 
congressional agreement to Puerto Rican self-government over local affairs is not at 
all clear. Not only was it evident to both the federal government and Puerto Rico that 
the events of 1950 to 1952 marked a constitutional transformation, that 
understanding was the basis of binding representations made to the world at large. 
Courts once looked to these representations in their interpretation of Public Law 600 
and what followed.153 As far as Puerto Rico, the rest of the United States, and even 
the United Nations were concerned, Puerto Rico became “sovereign” in terms of 
obtaining political agency. Yet all of these considerations did not sway the Supreme 
Court in Sanchez Valle; indeed, the U.S. federal government’s representations to the 
United Nations did not merit even a mention in the majority opinion. 
Failure to recognize Puerto Rico’s transformative constitutional moment may be 
less obvious in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Franklin Trust, but a similar 
logic was at play. The decision resolved as a practical matter a question of immense 
importance to Puerto Rico’s economic survival: the power of the Puerto Rican 
government to pass a bankruptcy scheme to restructure its insolvent public utilities 
in the middle of a massive economic crisis. But the Court resolved this question by 
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engaging in a highly technical statutory interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.154 
The Bankruptcy Code originally expressly included Puerto Rico in the definition of 
“state,”155 which meant that Puerto Rico could legislate reorganization procedures 
for its agencies or political subdivisions. Subsequent amendment, however, removed 
Puerto Rico from the category of states, meaning that it could neither be a debtor 
under the Code nor authorize any insolvency scheme of its own. While Puerto Rico 
is thus not a state for purposes of the “gateway provision”—that is, it cannot 
authorize municipalities to seek relief under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code—the 
Court held Puerto Rico should still be considered a state for purposes of preemption, 
thereby preventing it from restructuring on its own terms.156 The decision paid no 
attention at all to the nature of Puerto Rico’s sovereignty under Public Law 600 and 
the Puerto Rico Constitution; the Court treated it as if it were simply a nonstate, 
subordinate, political jurisdiction, no different from Detroit or any other 
municipality, rather than a territory able to claim congressional recognition of its 
political institutions and with its own constitution.  
Both of these Supreme Court decisions undermined the effective relationship 
between Puerto Rico and the rest of the United States. After decades of internal and 
international representations that Puerto Rico was not a U.S. colony, the Court traced 
its power to the moment of colonization and treated it as a subsidiary governmental 
unit; the Supreme Court embraced the Department of Justice’s position that Puerto 
Rico’s putative sovereignty was only a matter of legislative grace without legal 
substance. As summarized by the Court, “the dual-sovereignty test we have adopted 
focuses on a different question: not on the fact of self-rule, but on where it came 
from.”157 The birthmark of imperial conquest proves indelible. 
IV. CONGRESS WEIGHS IN 
As hard as it may be to recall, Puerto Rico was a great economic success story 
until the end of the twentieth century. Beneficial treatment of the island under federal 
law provided a significant spur to local economic development, most notably through 
generous corporate tax exemptions that spurred the growth of a dynamic industrial 
sector.158 The period following the 1950–52 “constitutional moment” featured 
dramatic economic growth, with the Commonwealth outperforming the Asian 
“tigers” whose economic takeoff would dazzle observers in the late twentieth 
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century.159 The Federal Tax Reform Act of 1976 established a more robust version 
of an economic opportunity zone under Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code, 
which entrenched the preferential tax treatment of production on the island.160 The 
combination of reduced corporate taxes, free entry into the American product market, 
and other economic incentives created a thriving manufacturing sector, particularly 
in the pharmaceutical industry. Under Section 936, Puerto Rico became a center for 
not only pharmaceutical but also light manufacturing industries for whom the 
combination of a low tax structure, proximity to the United States, and tariff-free 
entry into the American market was a winning combination. 
As a result, the gross national product of the island increased more than four-fold 
from 1947 to 1993, with the biggest acceleration after 1976.161 By 1985, forty-two 
percent of the deposits in commercial Puerto Rican banks were from corporations 
structured to take advantage of Section 936,162 and these tax credits became one of the 
central drivers of growth in the Puerto Rican economy.163 Unfortunately, this regime 
did not last. 
After the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which 
limited the tax benefits corporations could claim,164 Congress, responding to a 
complex set of political incentives, eliminated the Section 936 credit entirely in the 
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, with a ten-year phase out.165 According 
to World Bank figures for the period 1996 to 2014, the end of Section 936 
precipitated Puerto Rico’s descent into a prolonged recession: growth rates averaged 
2.17% in the eight years prior to the repeal of Section 936; in the eight years after 
Section 936 was repealed, the economy actually contracted 0.49% on average; the 
economy grew only two years of those eight.166 
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As manufacturing began to wane, Puerto Rico turned to debt financing to 
underwrite its budgetary obligations. The Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917 exempted 
Puerto Rican bonds from federal, state, and municipal taxation.167 Puerto Rico’s 
bonds were backed by the Commonwealth regardless of the issuing authority.168 The 
Commonwealth constitution even emphasized borrowing as a potential source of 
funding, including a provision to reassure investors by requiring that the Secretary 
of the Treasury of Puerto Rico “apply the available revenues including surplus to the 
payment of interest on the public debt.”169 Puerto Rican law further limited local 
taxation of revenues from bonds. Finally, Puerto Rico was excluded from Chapter 9 
of the Bankruptcy Code, which allowed states to authorize bankruptcy procedures 
for their political subdivisions.170 This meant that bondholders could lend to Puerto 
Rico’s agencies and municipalities with little prospect of being subjected to 
cramdown reorganizations in case of financial crises. The effect was to make Puerto 
Rican debt an attractive investment, even as the economy tottered.171 
The combination of the end of Section 936 and increasing local and federal 
protection for bond creditors served to simultaneously depress manufacturing and 
facilitate the expansion of public debt, paving the road for Puerto Rico to become 
America’s Greece. As is common in economies funded by debt, mismanagement and 
corruption became endemic problems. The island is currently $123 billion in debt, 
with $49 billion in unfunded pension obligations.172 The poverty rate stood at forty-
five percent and unemployment at eleven percent,173 all before Hurricane Maria 
reduced much of the Puerto Rican archipelago to rubble. Indeed, former Governor 
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García Padilla already described the economy as being in a “death spiral” in 2016,174 
and this was well before Hurricane Maria. 
Even without the impact of Maria, the sheer size of Puerto Rico’s debt relative to 
its total population and the high level of poverty and dependency made a financial 
crisis unavoidable. By the time Governor García Padilla rightly sounded the alarm 
about the Commonwealth’s insuperable debt load and initiated efforts to bring 
spending under control, even the best efforts at fiscal restraint by the 
Commonwealth’s political actors had the feel of fighting off a forest fire with a 
garden hose. The question became what to do with the limited time and resources 
available. Much of the debt was accumulated by local government entities in Puerto 
Rico, or through bond offerings by public agencies such as utilities,175 all of which 
were ultimately backstopped by the Commonwealth government. At the same time, 
as confirmed in Franklin Trust, Puerto Rico could neither declare its own bankruptcy 
nor create a bankruptcy work-out procedure for its subordinate jurisdictions without 
congressional intervention.  
If debt relief were to come from without, it would likely resemble one of three 
basic models for external debt restructuring. The first responds to a demand from 
international banking authorities and creditors by creating a new fiscal order, in 
exchange for which the debtor is permitted continued access to international credit 
markets (we will term this the “Argentine model”).176 The second uses the debtor’s 
membership in preexisting political organizations to impose similar forms of fiscal 
restructuring and austerity but oblige the debtor’s own leadership to implement the 
austerity measures and allow it some discretion as to how austerity will be achieved 
(the “Greek model”).177 The final one is to suspend the authority of the debtor 
political unit and subordinate its governmental functions to operate under the aegis 
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of a higher-level political authority to whom the insolvent polity already belongs, 
who will once again impose fiscal restrictions and austerity but under its own legal 
authority (the “Detroit model”).178  
Each of these three involves a suspension of some of the attributes of a 
government’s sovereign authority under the strains of insolvency. Greece could 
protest the harshness of the austerity terms, but the final decision on the future 
structure of the Greek state and economy was going to be made in Berlin, Frankfurt, 
or Brussels—not Athens. Similarly, protest as they might, Detroit voters were going 
to have to make their appeals to the broad electorate of Michigan, many of whom 
were well distant to the interests of Detroit as a matter of geography, partisanship, 
race, or a combination thereof. And even in the case of Argentina, the ability to “just 
say no” to international demands was a temporary expedient that ultimately yielded 
to the need to pay off bondholders as a condition of renewed access to international 
credit and trade. 
But coercive as all forms of restructuring may be at bottom, the Argentine, Greek, 
and Detroit models all respect, at least to a degree, the rights of democratic 
engagement by the affected populations. In Argentina, the need to obtain political 
buy-in from the population of the debtor gave at least some leverage to the Argentine 
government in the negotiations with the more powerful creditors. In the case of 
Detroit, municipal restructuring took place under the supervision of the political 
authorities of Michigan, who were in turn (at least in theory) democratically 
accountable to the citizen-voters of Detroit. Greece too retained its positions in all of 
the European Union governing institutions for the duration of the crisis, and the need 
for ultimate electoral approval by Greek voters was a central point in negotiations. 
The voters of Greece, Argentina, and Detroit all had an electoral stake in how their 
governors implemented fiscal reform, and election results in all three had an impact 
on the deals that were eventually cut. This is what ultimately differentiates being part 
of a democratic polity from being a subordinated colonial supplicant. 
Compare, by way of contrast, Congress’s effort to restructure Puerto Rico’s debts 
in the 2016 Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act 
(PROMESA).179 Under PROMESA, any fiscal plan or budget developed by the 
Commonwealth’s central government needs to be approved by an Oversight Board 
before implementation.180 That Board has the authority to generate revenue 
forecasts181 and to authorize the Governor to lower the minimum wage.182 Most 
centrally, under Chapter III of PROMESA, the Oversight Board has the authority to 
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represent Puerto Rico in a reorganization of the island’s obligations by a court to be 
designated by the Chief Justice of the United States.183  
PROMESA now oversees the largest reorganization of a public entity in 
American history.184 Unlike Detroit (or, by extension, Greece or Argentina) the 
authority of the PROMESA Board (or the “junta”185 to use the more evocative term 
in Spanish) has no democratic accountability to the polity facing its decisions on 
austerity and debt cancellation. The PROMESA Board is selected by the President 
from lists submitted from the Speaker of the House, Majority Leader of the Senate, 
Minority Leader of the House, and the Minority Leader of the Senate, and a single 
member selected solely at the discretion of the President.186 Only “off-list” 
nominations, selections of an individual not provided on one of the aforementioned 
lists, are subject to Senate confirmation187 (an expedient designed, as the House 
Report on PROMESA makes plain, to ensure that the Oversight Board had a 
Republican majority—this to oversee a population that is largely made up of would-
be Democratic voters).188  
When viewed in terms of democratic accountability to the affected citizens, 
PROMESA has no formal antecedents in the Argentine, Greek, or Detroit models. 
The Board has only an obligation to consult with Puerto Rican authorities, not to 
obtain their approval. Puerto Ricans do not vote for any members of Congress or the 
Electoral College. Despite an aspiration “to coordinate with an eye to consensus in 
the enactment of the fiscal plan, the [Board] has final authority to establish the fiscal 
plan and local budgets.”189  
As a result, Puerto Ricans are the only U.S. citizens who do not have the right to 
vote for those officials with ultimate budgetary authority over them.190 If anything 
hearkens back to the imagery of colonialism, it is the utter lack of a claim to self-rule 
in the most fundamental attributes of government that PROMESA exemplifies. 
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What distinguishes the PROMESA model is the lurking colonial imagery that 
comes from the lack of political accountability of the PROMESA Board to anyone 
in Puerto Rico. This distinguishes Puerto Rico from the domestic applications of the 
“dictatorship for democracy” model of financial control boards promoted by David 
Skeel (now a member of the PROMESA Board) and Clayton Gillette191 whose 
proposals192 were largely followed in the PROMESA legislation.193 Unlike the 
collapse of “normal politics” in a municipal bankruptcy in the United States, the 
fiscal woes in Puerto Rico are not merely a local contrivance but are also in part a 
function of the web of federal laws that simultaneously make unviable many routes 
to durable economic growth on the island. 
Identifying the troubling antidemocratic character of PROMESA is not to claim 
that it was either not necessary or designed to be malevolent. Although the debt 
restructuring provisions of PROMESA were modeled after Chapter 9 of the Federal 
Bankruptcy Code,194 PROMESA critically differs in having several pro-debtor 
provisions that are of great benefit to Puerto Rico. These include allowing a debtor 
to use collateral to pay expenses, allowing a debtor to obtain credit while in 
proceedings in order to continue functioning without any protection for the lien 
holder, and having no “safe harbor” that would allow a creditor to terminate 
derivative contracts with Puerto Rico during the reorganization proceedings.195 
Overall, PROMESA has more protections for Puerto Rico during a bankruptcy than 
Puerto Rico would have obtained if its subordinate jurisdictions were allowed to file 
for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.196  
Even as the callous appointments process to the PROMESA Board has provoked 
great anger in Puerto Rico,197 there is little desire to overturn the needed protections 
of the statute. Without bankruptcy protection, Puerto Rico could become a failed 
government without even internal protection. And, although not formally a part of 
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the political process that yielded PROMESA, Puerto Ricans in the United States are 
politically active and a forceful constituency in Florida, Illinois, and New York, and 
concern for Puerto Rican welfare has drawn considerable support from various forces 
on the political left;198 the island is not altogether without political leverage. 
As it has proceeded about its business, the PROMESA Board has, thus far, been 
careful about its demands for any further compromise of the Commonwealth’s 
governmental functions. While pensioners and civil servants will bear the brunt of 
any reduction in government expenditures, the story thus far is one of basically 
respectful engagement in a horribly difficult environment. For example, the 
PROMESA Board has reached agreements to liquidate Puerto Rico’s central bank, 
the Government Development Bank, after it defaulted on $422 million of debt in 
April of 2016.199 Puerto Rico’s utility companies also reached a deal with the help of 
the Oversight Board to restructure its debt and lower customer rates over the next six 
years.200  
Indeed, it has been Puerto Rico’s hedge fund creditors who have filed for relief 
from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 and 922, so they can pursue an action 
against the PROMESA Oversight Board on a constitutional basis,201 either as a 
violation of the Appointments Clause,202 or the requirement under the Bankruptcy 
Clause that Congress’s authority must be exercised “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws 
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”203 By and large, Puerto 
Rico’s political elites appear to have made the calculation that they are better off with 
PROMESA, notwithstanding its neo-colonialist sheen, than without it. 
However beneficial PROMESA may turn out to be, it is still a paternalistic 
intervention imposed from without. Congress’s intervention in PROMESA, then, 
was the realization of the rebellion of the Executive Branch and the formalism of the 
Supreme Court. In microcosm, it represents the culmination of the process by which 
any constitutional arrangement, and indeed any modus vivendi, unravels. The 
“compact” and “consent” that empowered the people of Puerto Rico after 1952 was 
gently worn away. 
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-oversightboard-idUSKBN17U1ZG [https://perma.cc/7DWV-SXUP]. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Motion of Aurelius for Relief from the Automatic Stay, In re Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, No. 17-BK-3283-LTS (D.P.R. Aug. 7, 2017).  
 202. Id. at 12; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 203. Stephen J. Lubben, PROMESA and the Bankruptcy Clause: A Reminder About 
Uniformity, 12 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 53, 53 (2017) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). 
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V. WHERE TO NOW? 
A. The Insular Cases Redux 
It is odd to see in the current issues over Puerto Rico a replaying of the same 
considerations that bedeviled the first imperial acquisition of territory by the United 
States following the Spanish-American War.204 These questions of empire, hotly 
debated at the turn of the century, played out in the election of 1900 and, ultimately, 
in the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Insular Cases.205 Each of these cases was a 
variation on a basic fact pattern: goods were shipped between the United States and 
one of the new territories, duties were levied on the shipment, and a constitutional 
challenge ensued as to whether constitutional and statutory guarantees of free 
shipment of goods could be invoked to resist any attempted tariff. In each case, the 
presumption of uniform treatment would have condemned any tariff on trade within 
the United States while leaving similar exactions on external trade to the authority of 
Congress and the President over foreign relations. 
The Court’s early engagement with the issue yielded the conclusion that, since 
Puerto Rico had been handed to the United States by Spain, it was wholly integrated 
in the United States’ territory and hence, as a purely domestic entity, could no longer 
be considered foreign in any sense of the word. Accordingly, no tariff could be levied 
on the transport of goods from one part of the country to another.206 After a series of 
sharply divided 5–4 decisions, the Court finally reversed course and found that not 
only tariffs were the prerogative of Congress, but that the Territory Clause was a 
broad mandate to congressional experimentation with divergent models of 
governance. As set forth by Justice Brown, “the Constitution is applicable to 
territories acquired by purchase or conquest only when and so far as Congress shall 
so direct.”207 
Justice Brown created a bifurcated constitutional order that would permit both 
American control and a theory of territorial status that was neither state nor colony 
with different rights guarantees in each domain.208 In this sense, the Insular Cases 
anticipated debates from the last part of the twentieth century on the incorporation of 
the protections of the Bill of Rights onto the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.209 On one hand, Brown saw the Constitution as a restraining document, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 204. See Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Regime of Political 
Apartheid, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 283, 288–90 (2007). 
 205. Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial 
Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 809–10 (2005) (spelling out the various cases thought 
to be part of the ongoing debate on insularity). 
 206. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 194–97 (1901).  
 207. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 279 (1901). 
 208. Id. at 282. 
 209. Though Justice Black argued that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated all 
elements of the Bill of Rights, Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71–72 (1947) (Black, J., 
dissenting), the Court has continued to incorporate elements of the Bill of Rights selectively. 
See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating the First Amendment); 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment); Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 
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providing negative liberty for American citizens by preventing the government from 
interfering with certain essential natural rights.210 On the other, the Constitution also 
provided for certain “artificial or remedial rights” that did not exist naturally, but 
rather as a grant by the government.211 Citizenship, suffrage, and judicial procedure 
are examples of this category.212 Given that Congress had not extended the 
Constitution in its entirety to Puerto Rico, artificial rights like the Uniformity Clause 
had not been extended either,213 and a tariff based on nonuniform treatment of the 
territories was constitutional.214  
The resolution was pragmatic rather than resting on any formalist reading of any 
particular clause of the Constitution. Like all pragmatic accommodations, the Insular 
Cases left much to the specific applications of divergent governance models across 
the various territorial acquisitions. Paradoxically, the Uniformity Clause emerges at 
the heart of the current challenge to the PROMESA bankruptcy process, this time led 
by hedge fund challengers to any haircut in the value of the debt they hold that they 
might be subjected to during the restructuring process.215 
And yet the pragmatic resolution of core constitutional protections being 
differentiated from specific applications survived the increasing distancing of 
American constitutional law from the Insular Cases. Partial incorporation of 
constitutional guarantees is the norm in the application of federal law to the states as 
the Fourteenth Amendment filled out its current constitutional form after World War 
II.216 Even matters as central as the right to trial by jury are left to state-by-state 
determination rather than extension of the Seventh Amendment. American Indian 
law goes further in not extending a presumption of constitutional incorporation to 
Indian tribes and instead affording critical constitutional rights as a matter of 
congressional mandate under the Indian Civil Rights Act.217 
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(incorporating the Eighth Amendment). 
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examples, including rights to freedom of religion, property, due process, and equal protection. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 283. 
 213. Id. at 286–87. 
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 215. See Mary Williams Walsh, Hedge Fund Sues to Have Puerto Rico’s Bankruptcy Case 
Thrown Out, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/07 
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 216. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 292, 341–42 (White, J., concurring) (The question is “not 
whether the Constitution is operative, for that is self-evident, but whether the provision relied 
on is applicable.” (emphasis added)); see also ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS:  A 
COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS 16 n.45 (1989) 
(setting out doctrines of partial incorporation of U.S. law as applied to Puerto Rico). 
 217. The Constitution is not self-executing on Indian tribal land and is only partially 
incorporated pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304 (2012 & Supp. 
IV 2017). See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 383 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[I]t has 
been understood for more than a century that the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment 
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U.S. 191, 194 (1978) (finding that due process protections accorded under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act are analogous, but “not identical,” to those guaranteed under the Constitution); see 
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The key to the reasoning across the Insular Cases is the centrality of congressional 
action. The governance of the newly acquired territories was left to political 
resolution rather than being compelled by any formal inherent obligation from the 
Constitution as such. For Justice Edward D. White’s influential concurrence in 
Downes, the reasoning of which the Court adopted by 1922,218 congressional 
authority over how to govern territories219 yielded the odd (but in our view appealing) 
conclusion that Puerto Rico was not foreign per se, but rather “foreign to the United 
States in a domestic sense.”220 As we shall develop in the next Section, the focus on 
the scope of congressional authority grounds the discussion of Puerto Rico in 
comparable concepts developed in the context of Indian law, where the Court 
recognizes the presumption of tribal sovereignty “unless and until” there is contrary 
action by Congress.221 The fact that Congress may act in contrary fashion does not 
diminish the core sovereignty principle of American Indian law. Nor does the 
superior sovereignty of the United States diminish the obligation of Congress to be 
clear in its override of tribal authority.222 
Despite the divided opinions and lack of controlling rationale, the leading 
opinions of the Insular Cases provide a constitutional flexibility missing in both the 
executive pronouncements of late and the recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 
Some notion of what we will term “compacted sovereignty” should reemerge that 
would capture the notion of subordination of Puerto Rico, but subordination entered 
into by virtue of an exercise of popular sovereignty. The idea of compacted 
sovereignty captures both the sense that the sovereignty is the basis of the 
fundamental compact establishing the relation between the two polities, and also that 
the resulting sovereignty has been “compacted” to be less fulsome than plenary 
sovereignty. As expressed by former Governor Rafael Hernández Colón, recognition 
of the transformative role of the exercise of popular sovereignty “sets the 
groundwork for the democratic experimentation required to fulfill the asymmetric 
legitimacy of those areas not incorporated as a state in the Union.”223 Relying on 
                                                                                                                 
 
also FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 667 (1982 ed.) (“Many significant 
constitutional limitations on federal and state governments are not included in the Indian Civil 
Rights Act . . . .”). 
 218. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922).  
 219. Downes, 182 U.S. at 339–41. 
 220. Id. at 341–42. 
 221. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2016). 
 222. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (2014). 
 223. Colón, supra note 189, at 592. Governor Hernández Colón relies on a long series of 
cases following the 1952 Constitution that recognize the core independent legal status of 
Puerto Rico over its internal affairs. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 
416 U.S. 663, 673–74 (1974) (reaffirming Puerto Rico’s power to determine scope of own 
legislation); United States v. Rivera Torres, 826 F.2d 151, 154 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming 
Congress’s power to legislate Puerto Rico in manner different from U.S. states); United States 
v. Quiñones, 758 F.2d 40, 42 (1st Cir. 1985) (determining Congress no longer has plenary 
power over Puerto Rico); Cordova v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 
1981) (holding Puerto Rico considered  “state” when applying Sherman Act to activities on 
island); Moreno Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 68, 69–72 (1st Cir. 1958) (determining U.S. 
criminal law applied to Puerto Rico after achieving commonwealth status); Guerrido v. Alcoa 
Steamship Co., 234 F.2d 349, 351–52 (1st Cir. 1956) (accepting argument for continued 
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David Rezvani’s study of “Partially Independent Territories” (PITs) around the 
world,224 Hernández Colón argues that such arrangements allow “the partially 
independent political entities to reach a higher level of wellbeing than if they were 
independent” based upon unions that “are tailor-made to the specific political, 
nationalistic, and economic interests of a region rather than a framework that  
demands transformation of the core state.”225 
As Hernández Colón and Rezvani observe, the decolonization movement of the 
twentieth century saw—particularly in the Pacific—a slew of political arrangements 
take hold in which a sovereign-yet-subordinate political entity was recognized with 
a “superior” sovereign entity assuming some, but not all, of the functions that a 
sovereign state would customarily perform.226 Examples include the United States’ 
“trusteeship” over the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands after World War II;227 the 
United States’ “free association” with the newly-sovereign nations of Palau, the 
Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, which 
emerged from the trust territory;228 and New Zealand’s relationship, not replicated 
anywhere else in the world, with the “sovereign and independent state[s]” of the 
Cook Islands and Niue.229 Such arrangements exemplify the “inventive 
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ISLANDS JUDICIARY: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 35, 35–36 (2011), http://www.justice 
.gov.mp/uploads/History_Book_-_ch5-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LNZ-VG64].  
 228. The three free associated states are full members of the United Nations that issue their 
own passports and compete under their own flags at the Olympics. Nevertheless, they 
“outsource” to the United States certain key sovereign functions, like national defense and 
provision of certain vital social services. See U.S. Relations with the Federated States of 
Micronesia, U.S. DEP’T STATE (July 5, 2018), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1839.htm 
[https://perma.cc/V97C-8DFG]; U.S. Relations with Marshall Islands, U.S. DEP’T STATE  
(July 5, 2018), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26551.htm [https://perma.cc/7AJE-JLGC]; 
U.S. Relations with Palau, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.state.gov/r/pa 
/ei/bgn/1840.htm [https://perma.cc/F74U-CKF2]. So, while fully “sovereign” in one sense, 
they are illustrative of the innate pliability of the concept of “sovereignty.”  
 229. Joint Centenary Declaration of the Principles of the Relationship Between the Cook 
Islands and New Zealand, Cook Islands-N.Z., June 11, 2001. The Cook Islands and Niue make 
their own laws and may enter into treaties with other sovereign nations in their own right. See 
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statesmanship” that necessarily arose to meet the challenges of decolonization and 
gesture to the international pedigree of pragmatic accommodations akin to our notion 
of “compacted sovereignty.” As we discuss infra, however, we need not cross an 
ocean to find examples of this accommodation.  
Sovereignty is a contested concept, but there are at least four elements that appear 
key in this context, even when they exist in conjunction with an agreed upon 
subordination to another, higher sovereign. The first is the existence of a defined 
territory, something found in both American and international law.230 The second, as 
discussed earlier in the events leading to popular approbation of the 1952 Puerto Rico 
Constitution, is the exercise of a constituent power among the affected population 
that expresses a will to sovereignty. The third is the domestic exercise of the 
customary police powers over health and safety of the population by internal political 
authorities.231 And, finally, there is the self-identification as a nation, reflected in 
custom, shared political engagements, and even such matters as a national sports 
team.232 
Perhaps not surprisingly, American Indian law recognizes just this concept of 
subordinated sovereignty, rooted in the preexisting historic claims to sovereignty of 
the tribes and the subsequent integration through treaty. Both Indian law and the 
Insular Cases introduce a heavy racialist dose into the constitutional prescription. 
But both rest on the idea that limited sovereignty is necessary to preserve ways of 
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64 (2002) (describing statement of New Zealand to the Lomé Council of Secretariat in 1979 
explaining the “international position of the Cook Islands”); REZVANI, supra note 224, at 93. 
 230. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892) (citing Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 
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political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe”); United States 
v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (“It is undisputed that Indian tribes have power to 
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AMERICAN INDIANS § 30 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 4, 2017) [hereinafter 
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 232. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY 
RIGHTS 11 (1995) (defining a nation within a multicultural context as “a historical community 
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life that should not be fully integrated into American society because the people who 
practice those ways of life do not want them to be so integrated. In the context of 
American Indian law, given the brutality of the conquest of the Indian lands and the 
extermination of the bulk of the population, the reliance on the fiction of a treaty-
based agreement among sovereigns is at best a comforting legal construction. But 
the strained concept of a compact or contractual agreement serves to organize a 
relationship in which there are strong measures of self-governance and some burden 
of express justification for overriding tribal authority in favor of national 
uniformity.233  
B. Reconsidering the Parallels to American Indian Law 
The question is then whether such concepts of compacted sovereignty could be 
invoked for territorial Puerto Rico after the changes of the 1950–52 period. Certainly 
the textual commands of the Constitution do not support any distinction between the 
scope of federal authority over both territories and tribal lands, nor does the historical 
record.234 Both are treated as a subset of congressional authority, with Congress 
having the “[p]ower to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory” of the United States and having the power to “regulate 
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.”235 Even if the textual differences were 
significant, it remains the case that, as one of us has previously written, “the sui 
generis constitutional flexibility for Indian tribes even from the Founding,236 much 
of which was drawn from extratextual international law understandings,237 
legitimates heterogeneous arrangements within the American system outside [a] 
strict . . . understanding of the Constitution.”238 The result is that “group-
                                                                                                                 
 
 233. We also note that a model of compacted sovereignty is consistent with solutions that 
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 238. Rennie, supra note 98, at 1715 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
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differentiated rights resting on the Insular Cases are not so strange after all, as the 
American constitutional order has—from its very creation—contemplated extra-
constitutional arrangements in the example of Indian law.”239 
Comparison to Indian law is not intended to say that Puerto Rico should be treated 
as are Indian tribes, or that such treatment would be more respectful of the political 
rights of the island. Even under Sanchez Valle, Puerto Rico retains full police powers 
over the island, and anyone committing a crime in Puerto Rico is subject to criminal 
prosecution––a right not given tribal authorities over non-Indians.240  
Nonetheless, the comparison to Indian law reveals the absurdity of the “original 
position” doctrines assumed by the Court in Sanchez Valle. Consider the present 
position of the Cherokee Nation, now headquartered in Tahlequah, Oklahoma. The 
Cherokee are a southeastern tribe who, in the fashion recounted by the Court in 
Sanchez Valle as being characteristic of all Indian land agreements, entered into a 
treaty ceding land in exchange for benefits to the members of tribal land in Georgia. 
Following a minor gold rush in Georgia, however, Congress passed the Indian 
Removal Act of 1830,241 which then prompted an effort to remove the Cherokee and 
other eastern Indian tribes. In Worcester v. Georgia, the Supreme Court struck down 
the efforts to expel the Cherokee from their treaty-recognized dwelling and ordered 
the protection of tribal land claims, to no avail.242 President Andrew Jackson openly 
disregarded the Court’s order, and the ensuing forcible removal of the Cherokee and 
other tribes has come to be known historically as the “Trail of Tears.” In all, about 
one quarter of the Cherokee population died in the ensuing relocation to land in 
Oklahoma.243 Nonetheless, the Court in Sanchez Valle holds out the Indian tribal 
experience, including presumably that of the Cherokee, as a bastion of uninterrupted 
sovereignty because the original land grant took the form of a treaty—even if the 
treaty had been signed while staring down the wrong end of a rifle. 
The experience of the Cherokee might be an extreme example of conquest, but 
virtually all the treaty accommodations of tribal sovereignty begin not with the fact 
                                                                                                                 
 
 239. Id. at 1717; see also Frickey, supra note 236, at 31 (“[A]lthough sovereignty created 
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 243. See generally Indian Removal, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4 
/4p2959.html [https://perma.cc/FK7F-EVSW]. 
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of a compact among coequal sovereigns but with subjugation, typically by military 
force. If one were to abandon the formalism of status stemming from the moment of 
conquest, Indian law actually provides a number of instructive analogies to Puerto 
Rico. The tribes possess what Felix Cohen terms a “limited sovereignty.”244 Indian 
tribes simultaneously exist as domestic, dependent nations and retain their inherent 
sovereign authority.245 
Using American Indian law as a template, we can establish three governing 
principles for Puerto Rico. First, Puerto Rico exercises ordinary police powers over 
local matters of health, safety, and welfare absent express congressional 
determination to the contrary. Second, Puerto Rico exercises control over economic 
regulation of its internal markets absent an express congressional determination to 
the contrary. Finally, the exercise of local sovereignty cannot be inconsistent with 
the overriding interests of the United States; therefore, constitutional principles that 
are central to the national identity of the United States will apply in Puerto Rico. 
Each of these finds a parallel in Indian law. 
With regard to the police powers, Indian tribes “possess a certain degree of 
independent authority over matters that affect the internal and social relations of 
tribal life.”246 This tribal power to regulate internal and social matters has been 
affirmed across various contexts, including matters of health, safety, and welfare, 
and extends to conduct of non-tribal members that “threatens or has some direct 
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the 
tribe.”247 Such power extends into the economic domain, which the Court in Merrion 
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe termed “an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty” that 
“derives from the tribe’s general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity 
within its jurisdiction.”248 Indeed, this sovereign power to control economic activity 
is so extensive as to permit tribes to tax nonmembers on Indian lands.249 Finally, 
tribal sovereign power “is constrained so as not to conflict with the interests of this 
overriding sovereignty.”250 Therefore, deference must be afforded to the “overriding 
interests of the National Government,” that is, to the government of the United 
States.251 In practice, the concept of partial incorporation of federal constitutional 
and statutory guarantees is well set out in dealings between the federal government 
and states, tribes, and territories. 
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Tribal sovereignty creates an equivalent to the “presumption against preemption” 
with regard to state law: “courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intends 
to undermine Indian self-government.”252 The Supreme Court has cautioned that 
courts must “tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent.”253 
This principle of judicial caution informs how courts have interpreted ambiguous 
provisions of tribal law. “Courts will not lightly infer abrogation of tribal authority 
from ambiguous treaty terms.”254 Ambiguities in treaties are construed in favor of 
Indian tribes,255 and ambiguities in federal law are similarly resolved in favor of 
upholding tribal sovereignty:256 “[t]he legislative intent to abrogate tribal authority 
must be clear.”257 In fact, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Court went so far 
as to instruct that such congressional intent must be “unequivocally expressed.”258 A 
year later, the Court bolstered this sentiment, stating that “[a]bsent explicit statutory 
language, [it has] been extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty 
rights.”259  
American Indian law has well adapted to a regime of tribal sovereignty and 
congressional supremacy. The fact that one Congress cannot bind another and that 
tribes are not states does not mean that there is no capacity to recognize the 
compacted sovereignty. Indeed, there are parallels in the law governing foreign 
relations with regard to the “stickiness” of treaty obligations. Although, again, one 
Senate cannot foreclose a subsequent Congress or President from unwinding treaty 
obligations, there is nonetheless a legal presumption in favor of the enforceability of 
treaties and a heightened procedural test for treaty revocation.260  
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Relations with Indian tribes also introduce longstanding principles from 
international law on the consequences of treaty abandonment or treaty revocation.261 
Customary international law provides two sources of authority that challenge the 
Court’s crabbed sovereignty analysis from Sanchez Valle. First, Federal Indian law 
rests heavily on the presumed respect for aboriginal rights in the modern law of 
nations262––again lending support for Justice Breyer’s argument on the historical 
significance of longstanding, self-governing tribes in Puerto Rico. Second, by the 
nineteenth century, international law norms came to define sovereignty around issues 
of territory and self-organization and were recognized as controlling by federal 
officials charged with Indian relations.263 
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The closest parallel for treaty obligations with nonstate entities is again the 
relation with Indian tribal authority. While Congress can undo established 
agreements, there is nonetheless a process-based duty imposed on Congress such that 
Indian tribes retain their sovereign authority “unless and until Congress acts.”264 
Independent of the bankruptcy setting of Franklin Trust or the bizarre original 
position doctrine of double jeopardy law in Sanchez Valle, the core principles of 
Indian law offer a workable template for dealing with Puerto Rico. And, most 
critically, Indian law offers a historically appealing way of understanding the 
significance of Puerto Rico’s constitutional awakening in the 1950s.  
CONCLUSION 
We return to the question in our title. In the absence of independence and 
statehood, the commonwealth status of Puerto Rico stands in serious disrepair. The 
situation was already dire before Hurricane Maria, and an exodus of Puerto Ricans 
has eroded the island’s tax base, as young, educated, working-age citizens leave for 
greater opportunities on the mainland.265 The population fell 1.7% in a single year—
before the hurricane.266 The school system lost roughly 200,000 students from 2005 
to 2014, a massive drop considering the small population of Puerto Rico.267 In the 
past decade, one million Puerto Ricans moved to the Orlando area alone. Migrants 
to the mainland cite greater job opportunities, higher pay, lower crime, and more 
accountable, less corrupt government, as reasons to flee.268 But this migration has 
further eroded basic services on the island, as many people with essential skills like 
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doctors,269 teachers,270 or even technicians to repair damaged power lines in the wake 
of Hurricane Maria,271 have already fled the island. 
There is no popular desire for independence, statehood seems like a political 
nonstarter, and simply abandoning this island—and its millions of American 
citizens—to utter destitution simply cannot be the ultimate resolution for any society, 
let alone the richest on Earth. Much as sometimes happens in an ill-occasioned, 
youthful cohabitation under compulsion, sometimes history shows ways to work 
things out. If Puerto Rico and the rest of the United States are to continue to work 
together under the imprecise demands of a commonwealth marriage, current 
circumstances demand a renewal of vows under more exacting legal certainty. 
Compacted sovereignty for Puerto Rico under the congressional authority of the 
Territory Clause worked well enough for the second half of the twentieth century 
that it seems a relatively promising basis on which to refine relations. The example 
of American Indian law shows there is no constitutional barrier to its implementation. 
In light of the ill-considered responses of the Supreme Court, Congress, and the 
Executive, the question of “what is Puerto Rico” demands a clearer and better legal 
answer. 
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